Kargil Conflict : An Annotated Bibliography by Bi, Asma
KARGIL CONFLipT : 
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
<:d>uljmUtEa In jiaztiaL j-uLriLmEnt or the 
avjaia or Ins. aeaiet of 
1998^99 , , 
f^^n. 
, ^ * ^ 4 . ^ l^ 
Roll No. 98 LSM-07 
Enrol. No. BB-3460 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
LECTURER 
^tgatlf (Inbtx) 
1339 
DS3077 
^ r 
1 0 JUN 2000 
!-lio;ics: (0571 ) 'iOOO.W 
l u l G i i i i i l 1<>^ 
Iclex . ^M-•.U) AMU IN 
DEPARTMENT OF LIBRARY & INFORMATION SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH—202 002 {U.P.), INDIA 
Ref. No 
Dated...Ql-rJir.l^M. 
CERTIFICATE 
This is 10 certify that Ms. Asma Bi has completed her dissertation entitled 
"Kargil Conflect: An A.nnotated Bibliography", in partial fulfillment of the 
ieqairements for the degree of Master of Library and Information Science 
(1998-99). She has conducted the v/ork under my supers'ision and guidance. I 
deem it fit for submission. 
MS. SUDHARMA H.ARtoASAN 
LECTURER 
DEDl DTO 
CONTENTS 
Page No. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
Chapter - I 
AIMS, SCOPE & METHODOLOGY 1-4 
Chapter - II 
INTRODUCTION 5-24 
Chapter-ra 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 25-121 
Chapter - IV 
INDEXES 
a TITLE 122-132 
a AUTHOR 133-139 
a SUBJECT 140-145 
a LIST OF PERIODICALS 146-147 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
First and foremost, I would like to thank the Almighty, the Alfknowing, 
the most benevolent and merciful Allah, who provided all the strength and 
guidance for the compilation of this dissertation. 
I wish to express my sincere and earnest thanks to my teacher and 
supervisor Ms. Sudharma Haridasan, Lecturer, Department of Library and 
Information Science, A.M.U. Aligarh, for her encouragement, cooperation and 
guidance which helped in understanding the problems involved. 
I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to my respected teacher 
Prof Shabahat Husain, Chairman, Department of Library and Information 
Science, A.M.U. for his inspiring support. 
My sincere thanks are due to my respected teacher Mr. S. Mustafa K.Q. 
Zaidi, Reader, Department of Library and Information Science, A.M.U. 
I am extremely grateful to my respected teachers, Mr. Naushad Ali P.M., 
Mr. Masoom Raza and Ms. Nishat Fatima, Lecturer of the Department of Library 
and Information Science, A.M.U. 
I would like to pay my thanks to Mr. Riaz Abbas and Mr. Asrar Ahamd 
Khan staff of the Seminar Library of the department, specially my sincere thanks 
to Mr. Raisul Hasan, Semi Professional of the Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., for 
their whole heartedly cooperation during the period of my study and dissertation 
work. 
I am extremely grateflil to my friend Miss Haieema Siddiqui for her 
continuous help in the compilation of this Bibliography. 
I am also grateful to all my friends, family members, relatives and well 
wishers, specially my local guardian Mr. Shujaat Ali, for his inspiring support and 
patience at every step to complete my dissertation. 
My heart felt thank are due to Al-Humera Computer Centre. 
MS. ASM A BI 
\ 
/ 
CHAPTER I 
/ 
\ 
AIMS AND SCOPE 
Kargil conflict is a burning issue in the present day context, so is the topic 
of the dissertation, "Kargil Conflict: An annotated Bibliography" Articles 
related to this area covering the conflict of Kargil between India and Pakistan, 
which has started from 26* May, 1999. It was the very serious situation which 
arose from one simple fact; the decision of Pakistan to cross the line of control, to 
sent its men and materials to occupy our territory. 
The present work is in the form o£<Annotated Bibliography is the result of 
a continuous and constant attempt of searching all relevant literature available on 
Kargil Conflict. The basic aim of this bibliography is to bring together the 
documents and Periodicals, articles published in Indian and Foreign journals and 
composite books on the subject it includes 205 articles. 
METHODOLOGY 
The procedure followed in Compiling this Bibliography is as follows: 
1. The secondary sources are consulted in Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U. 
Aligarh to find out the Location of the articles. These are: 
1.1. Index India (Rajasthan University Jodhpur). 
1.2. Indian Press Index (Indian documentation Service Gurgaon). 
1.3. Guide to Indian periodical Literature (Delhi Library Association). 
1.4. The Primary sources were consulted in Libraries of Aligarh and Delhi. 
2. SUBJECT HEADINGS: 
"Subject Headings" to all these entries have been assigned which are 
completely co-extensive to the extend possible. If more than one entry comes 
under the same subject heading, these are arranged alphabetically by the author 
(s) name, or by periodical name. 
3. ARRANGEMENT: 
The entries in the Bibliography are arranged alphabetically under subject 
headings, following letter by letter method. The entry element of the author is in 
Capital letters followed by the secondary element in parenthesis using capital 
and small letters and then the title of the article, sub-title (if any), then name 
of the periodical being underlined followed by the Volume, issue, the year, the 
month and date, and pages of the articles. Each entry is then followed by an 
informative abstract of the article. 
4. STANDARD FOLLOWED: 
The relevant Bibliographical details were noted down on 5" x 7" cards 
following ISI standards. Care has been taken to follow strictly the rules and 
practice of CCC, as it gives a uniformity for the Bibliographical references. The 
arrangement for the Bibliographical references is the following: 
a. Serial number on the entry number. 
b. Surname (Fore name) of the Author / Authors. 
c. Full stop ( . ) 
d. Title of the article including subtitle (if any) 
e. Full stop ( . ) 
f. Name of the Periodical in full being underlined. 
g. Semicolon ( ; ) 
h. Volume number 
i. Coma ( , ) 
j . Issue number 
k. Semicolon ( ; ) 
1. Year of publication 
m. Coma ( , ) 
n. Month 
o. Coma ( , ) 
p. Date 
q. Semi colon (;) 
r. Inclusive page of articles. 
SPECIMEN ENTRY: 
-,-,-, AGREEMENT 
13. NOORANI (AG). Aborted deal? Frontline. 16, 18; 1999, September, 
10; 31-32. 
EXPLANATION: This article is taken from the periodical "Frontline" 
which entitled "Aborted deal" , written by A.G. Noorani in Issue no 18 
of volume 16 of the 10, September, 1999, on the pages from 31 to 32 
against this entry. 
1. INDEXES: This part of the Bibliography contains author, title and list 
of subject headings in alphabetical sequence Each index gives the 
specific entry or entries in the Bibliography by the help of entry 
number. 
LIBRARIES VISITED: 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murty Bhawan, New 
Delhi. 
2. Maulana, Azad Library, A.M.U., Aligarh. 
a Seminar, Department of Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh. 
a Library of Coaching and Guidance Centre, A.M.U. Aligarh. 
• Seminar, Department of Management Studies, A.M.U., Aligarh. 
3. Sapru House Library, Institute of Defence Studies and analysis, Bara 
Khambha Road, New Delhi. 
4. Sapru House Library, Indian Council of World affairs, Bara Khambha Road, 
New Delhi. 
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CHAPTER II 
/ 
\ 
INTRODUCTION 
GENESIS 
We are well aware of the situation which has developed in Kargil, it is a 
serious situation, it is a situation fraught with danger, it is a situation that has 
airside^from one simple fact; the decision of Pakistan to cross the line of control, 
to send its men and materials to occupy our territory. 
No government can tolerate such an incursion, our government certainly 
will not. 
For this reason, our Indian Armed Forces have launched a major operation 
to drive them back. No one should entertain the slightest doubt; they shall not 
attained their objective. No one shall stop them till they have done so. 
The Shimla pact Agreement binds each side to respect the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty, and independence of the other, the clauses repeatedly 
enjoin the neither side shall use the threat of force or force to affect the territorial 
integrity of the other. 
The agreement deals specifically with the line of control. It lays down that 
the line of control resulting from the cease-fire on December 17, 1971 shall be 
respected by both sides. Furthermore that "Neither side shall seek, to alter it 
unilaterally" the agreement goes a step ahead and specifies. Both sides fiirther 
undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line. 
India wants peace, we are at place with all other neighbors of ours. We were 
taking major steps with Pakistan also towards undoing the fifty year history of 
bitterness. Our people desire it. Our government is committed to it. We have 
traveled quite some distance for it. 
CORE ISSUE OF KASHMIR MUST TAKE PRECEDENCE: 
The visit of Prime-minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee took place at a critical 
juncture in the History of Pakistan-India relation. Over the past fifty years, these 
relations have remained mired in wars. Tensions and confi-ontation. The core 
dispute of Jammu & Kashmir has remained unresolved. Firing between our troops 
till continues along the line of control and on the Siachen glacier. The line of 
control....through Jammu & Kashmir is only a glorified Cease-fire line(CFL) 
dating fi'om the 1947-48 war which has been rearranged following military 
operations in 1965 and 1971, and eventually demarcated on the map by mutual 
consent of India and Pakistan in the wake of Shimla Accord... therefore, does not 
enjoy the protection of International law or the sanctity of an international border. 
BUS DIPLOMACY AS HISTORY: 
There are a host of factors which have the potential of punctuating the bus 
diplomacy which include domestic compulsions, mutual mistrust, uncertainty, 
second thoughts, differing interpretations and in the extreme case fall of the 
government. These factors were swept away in the background by the sentimental 
avalanche that accompanied Vajpayee's Pakistan visit. 
The problem is that Sharif needs to find something he can sell to the army 
and to the Pakistan public. The life and blood of the people of Kashmir is at stake. 
What Sharif has to do is de-escalate public opinion and expectation within his 
country as much as de escalate the fighting on the line of control. It is a hard task 
but not impossible. After all he managed to sell February's bus diplomacy to a 
skeptical public. 
FROM LAHORE TO KARGIL: 
Within three months of its cobbling together a majority to lead the 
government at the centre, the stridently nationalistic BJP conducted nuclear tests 
at Pokhran to establish its patriotic powers. Pakistan declared its own entry into 
the exclusive club of nuclear powers, never mind the brave protests from its own 
peace activists to desist from the matching of nuclear machismo. The BJP's Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee and Muslim league's Nawaz Shrif chose to ride high on bus 
diplomacy. But less than 90 days after the rendezvous in Lahore, it seems as if the 
spirit of the summer of 1998 is sought to be ruthlesley reviewed with fierce 
combat on the ground and missiles shooting out of and being shot at warplanes 
hovering over the cold and barren reaches of Kargil. When will the curtain fall 
and what shape will the climax take? Do the internal political fortunes of the two 
tottering governments have anything to do with the bringing of the sub-
continental to the brink of war, so soon after the promise of peace? The motive 
behind the war drums being beaten again. An accompanying report records the 
response of peace activists from both sides and the strategies they think should be 
evolved so that same voices may silence the war cries again. 
THE KARGIL ISSUE: 
The war in Kargil was waiting to happen. For the whole of 1998 and half 
of 1999, newspapers have not tired themselves of reporting about the non-issues 
that have been raised by politicians of various shades. Pakistan succeeded in 
creating a sense of complacency, not only in the Indian leadership but the armed 
forces as well, to send armed intruders across the line of control and caught the 
nation unawares. 
For more than a month, the country has been engaged in intense military 
action. Indian casualties are mounting by the day. Though gains in territory are 
reported everyday, it is evident that the country cannot get rid of all the infiltrators 
for quite a long time. Hopes that International pressure might make Pakistan 
withdraw have been shattered as the infiltrators, or mujahideen as they like to be 
called, think that they are conducting a religions war and are not willing to accept 
any international agreement made by the Prime-minister of their own country. 
There is little that the world can do but wait and hope that the conflict does not 
escalate into a fijU fledged war. 
Both India and Pakistan can ill afford a war or escalated hostilities. 
Though India is better placed in this regard, it has the enormous poll expenditure 
to contend with as well as the growing skepticism amongst foreign investors 
brought on by the political instability. By its Kargil Adventism Pakistan may have 
scored a tactical triumph of sorts, but it has far more to lose in the long run: its 
economy, already debilitated by US sanctions following the May 1998 nuclear 
tests, can be convulsed even fiirther if it embarks on a war. 
FLARE-UP IN KARGIL: 
The response of government in India to the flair-up in Kargil deserves to 
be unreservedly commended and supported. It is cool, calculated and wise. 
The military operations including air strikes, to dislodge the marauders 
from their mountain hideout in Kargil area and derive them beyond the line of 
control drawn up for the armed forces of India and Pakistan under the Shimla 
accord are being carried out with professional efficiency. The Kargil flair-up 
while it poses grave dangers which have to be squarely faced, may even open up 
opportunities which should not be missed by India as the most viable and 
potentially most influential political geographical entity in South Asia. 
INDIA-PAKISTAN: 
War like situation in Kargil sector: 
In the first week of May, they began pounding the strategic highway 
linking Srinagar to Leh. 
Tensions escalated when India moved in an entire army division and 
pumped in additional artillery to evict the intruders and started operation vijay on 
May 8, 1999. Operation vijay took a dramatic turn on May 26 when Indian Air 
Force fighters started air strikes on the intruders camp tucked away on high 
ridges. 
The Indian military leadership is now talking in terms of redeployment of 
forces in the Kargil sector, in which forward defense positions in the high ahitude 
areas will be staffed throughout the year after neutralizing the intruders. 
However in the wake of Pakistani intruders holding positions in Mushkoh 
valley, Drass, Kaksar, Batalik, Yaldora, Chaarbat La and Turtuk areas, the Indian 
military strategy is now poised for a major shift. 
Beyond Kargil: 
India has won the Kargil war, its second successive victory after the 
liberation of Bangladesh. Kargil has highlighted the grave deficiencies in the 
management of defense fiinding through taking risks in depressed alLocations in 
fervor of populist measures. 
Although Prime-minister Nawaz Sharif has as before the war, emerged the 
strongest node of power in Pakistan, the army, the ISI and fiindamentalist groups 
continue to call some of the shots. Prime-minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee claimed. 
VijayoflO, July 1999. 
PROXY WAR AND PAK AGGRESSION IN KARGIL: 
The Kargil operation have been going on for sometimes. The events are 
recent and, therefore, need no reiteration, there are lessons to be learnt by both 
countries as far as conduct of operations is concerned. 
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Lessons for Pakistan: 
Pakistan's dmm beat of Jammu and Kashmir issue as an impending 
nuclear flash point has been overused. Pakistan's economy cannot sustain for long 
burden of confrontation against India. 
Lessons for India: 
There may be no normalcy of relations with Pakistan without solving the 
issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Diplomacy such as bus ride to Lahore is no 
substitute for well prepared and painstaking negotiations on bilateral issues away 
from the glare of publicity. India needs to improve her intelligence set up. The 
line of control in the state of Jammu & Kashmir and the international borders 
need to be beefed up. 
After Armed Conflict In Kargil: 
For the intruders from Pakistan to start withdrawing under military and 
diplomatic pressure and the announcement of the schedule of general election to 
the lok sabha on the same day is a happy coincidence. 
The military operation in Kargil have unquestionably taken a heavy tool, 
political, economic and above all human in both the India and Pakistan. The 
Pakistan government which connived at the intrusion into India territory beyond 
the line of control drawn up for the armed forces of India and Pakistan, on the 
other hand, acted irresponsibly the sentiments of the people of Kashmir, too, 
which will be favorable to India in the long drawn contention between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir. 
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While there is much satisfaction and even celebration over the military 
powers of India in Kargil, India must not lose sight of the threat of intervention by 
the USA. The stand of Prime-minister, A.B. Vajpayee, on asserting political 
independence of India and speed up economic measures which barter away the 
strategic heights of the Indian economy to foreign, especially USA. 
Pak volte-face led to LOC. Imbroglio in Kargil: 
The recent Kargil incursion has thrown up a plethora of questions which 
still remain unsolved despite the Kargil imbroglio coming to an apparent and with 
the Indian side proclaiming a resounding victory over the Pakistani backed 
intruders while the Pakistani side endeavoring to portray a different picture. The 
genesis of problem stemmed from the contrasting perceptions regarding the line 
of control of both the neighbors. 
This attitude indicated complete ignorance about the meticulous care and 
thoroughness with which this line was discussed, surveyed where necessary, 
identified on ground and delineated on maps giving detailed grid references and 
description of land mark. 
These were checked and double checked before the representative of the 
two countries signed the documents pertaining the Loc. and which there after 
were approved by both the governments. 
The line of control was divided into three segments namely the Southern 
sector, central sector and Northern sector. Several other sector commanders and 
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sub sector commanders also assisted in the whole process to the ground work 
along the line of control. 
Ambiguity over Loc. was non-existent: 
In the post Shimla accord era there has been little scope for ambiguity 
regarding the line of control either in India or Pakistan. In this regard it is 
pertinent to mote that for the last 27 year, the Loc. in Jammu and Kashmir has 
stood the test of time. It is worthwhile to add that each of these flag meetings, 
wherein these Localised conflicts used to get resolved, turned into healthy 
competition in hospitality extension to the parties involved in the negotiations. 
Even the paragraph dealing with the Loc. in the Shimla Accord reads. 
In order to initiate the process of the establishment of a durable place in 
the subcontinent, both the governments should agree that the Loc. in Jammu and 
Kashmir which was the result of the Cease fire on December 17, 1972 should be 
respected by both the sides without any prejudice. Neither side shall seek to alter 
in unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both 
sides should under take to refi'ain from any kind of threat or use of fore towards 
violation this geographical demarcation. 
However, the armed incursion across the Loc. which was being planned 
by the Pakistani Army for the last few months while the Indian government was 
busy initiating the Lahore process and suffering firom an euphoria. 
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Total Secrecy Veiled Pakistani designs: 
The entire Pakistani government was aware of the extent of the operation 
as the Army obtained only an "in principle" concurrence from Prime-minister, 
Nawaz Sharif, the basic tents of the operation were utter secrecy, a cover plan to 
obfuscate the real designs as well as trying to bring about a defusing in the 
escalation of violence as early as possible. 
The Pakistani Army had few specific aims in view while planning the 
Kargil intrusion. Pakistan perceived that if the intrusions were successful then its 
troops would manage to secure a number of dominating heights from where the 
Srinagar-Leh Road could be interdicted at various places. The military operations 
vvQre carried out by four independent groups from four infantry battalions and two 
companies of special service group which were already there in the FCNA (Force 
Commander Northern Area). 
Meanwhile, Pakistani foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, continuously tried 
to obfuscate the issue. It was, the obituary to Operation Vijay. 
Open Pak support to ultras has changed Kashmir scene: 
The Kargil disaster proved to be the fourth successive fertile attempt by 
the Pakistanis and by the look of things, it may hot be the last attempt. 
What is the end result of this misadventure by Pakistan? At the 
international level, Pakistan is totally exposed and ostensibly isolated. The Kargil 
affair has created major differences within the Pakistan government itself Some 
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sections of the general populace have also turned against the government terming 
the Kashmir imbroglio as a wasteful endeavour. 
At the military level, this forth successive misadventure has demoralized 
the Pakistani army totally. Since the time terrorism erupted in the valley in 1989, 
Pakistan has always tired to ensure that nothing should be attributed to it directly. 
Kargil has also sent another disturbing signal for India and that is militancy, 
which had been relegated to the background in the recent past, has started looking 
interesting. 
The incursionists are feeling let down by the Nawaz Sharif government 
after it ordered v^athdrawal of the army fi-om the Indian territory and possibilities 
are that they will disperse across the state and create more trouble in the near 
future rendering the negotiation process impossible. 
It is a foregone conclusion that the saffron brigade will use the Kargil 
issue in political light for its own benefits albeit tacitly but that will hardly be a 
wise thing to do although, the guns have fallen silent to a great extent. 
The Battle Diary: 
April 1* : Intruders establish themselves 6-7 km. Inside Loc. set up strong points 
near Juber ridge. 
May 6*^  : infiltrators first sighted. 
May 9-11*'': Indian patrol by Major Rohitmour moved down on Subar ridge. 
May 15* : Eight killed in Kargil Shelly. 
May 16* : Infiltrators hushed. 
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May l?' ' ' : Kargil Shelling. 
May 18* : Kargil still in the line of fire. 
May 19* : militants killed in Kargil sector. 
May 20* : Army recaptures strategic positions in Kargil. Pakistani army had 
crossed Loc. 
May 21* : Army to counter Pak plan to Alter line of control. 
May 22°'': Pak fire Disrupts supply line dislocates villagers. Pakistan warns India 
against air power in Kargil. 
May 23'^''; Army denies reports of mare infiltrators mare Siachen Shelling forces 
army chief to avoid Kargil. 
May 24* : 600 infiltrators but no intelligence failure: Army. 
- Pakistan defying Lahore declarations. 
- Dislodging Kargil intruders vital. 
- Army brigade Head quarter hit Pakistan shelling. 
- Eviction difficult admits Army. 
May 26 ; bat wont ride over Kargil. 
- Pakistan Army, airforce on high alert. 
May 27* : Pakistan downs Indian MIG. 
May 28* : Medicines airlifted, hospitals on alert. 
May 29 : Civilians shifted to Sankoo as Kargil, Dras pounded. 
May 30* : Indian pilot being treated will : Pakistan army. 
May 31"': Kargil a ghost town. 
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June I'* : Fire fighting in Batalik 
June 2 : Batalik heights recaptured. 
June 3 : troops win Back a position in BataHk 
June 4 : 3 bodies of Pakistan army men recovered in Batalik area. 
June 5 ; Pakistan steps up artillery attack, targets Brigade. 
June 6 : Army regions crucial heights. Army wins back ridge near batalik 
June 7 : 22 Pakistani army men killed 50 far. 
June 8 : 6 Pakistani troops killed.two, militants held. 
June 9 : key position wrested mirage 2000 jets pound infiltrators 
June 10 : Pakistan SSG planning airdrop in Ladakh. 
June 11 : Officials Admit laxity on Loc. 
June 12 : Taliban force Ready for intrusion. 
June 13 : Tololing fell after guns spewed fire all might. 
June 14 : more successes for Army. 
June 15 ; pull back troops, Clinton tells. 
June 16 : Battle of Kargil, munthodhalo Area, Tololing, Marpola. 
June 17 : Operation vijay, army readies for final offensive on Tiger hills. Battles 
in Kargil dras sector. 
June 18 : battle in dras sector on point 5140. 
June 19 : Army admits to fighting battle in Kargil. 
June 20 : Indian troops gain in Kargil operation. 
- Army recaptures key point of tololing ridge. 
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June 21 : Another key point in Batalik regained 23 Pakistan soldiers killed two 
mud fortifications destroyed. 
June 22 : six Pakistani officers killed in munthodhalo raid Indian troops fighter 
hold. 
June 23 : How tololing was recaptured. 
June 24 : 28 intruders killed in Batalik, drass 800 more militant to be pushed in by 
Pakistan. 
June 25 : Pakistan has smuggled in almost three battalions of intruders. 
June 26 . Army loses 5 more soldiers. 
June 27 : lAF begins round the clock operation against intruders. 
June 28 : Siachen Area cleared 15 Pakistani troops killed. 
June 29 : Army takes peak 4700, tightens loose around tiger hills. 
June 30 : army takes peak 5100, reaches Loc. 
July 1 : Indian army recaptures four key post. 
July 2 : Tiger hill assault begins. 
July 3 : anti Aircraft guns deter Pakistan Air space violation. 
July 4 : Army employees three pronged strategy tiger hill recaptured 
July 5 : Pakistan promises to withdraw toe Loc. case fire only after pullout, agree 
Sharif, Clinton US to encourage Bilateral talks. 
July 6 : army begins clean up in kaksar intruder caught napping as army ponds 
post battle in batalik. 
July 7 : Juber hill, three more peaks captured. 
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July 8 : Sharif Returns home amid tight security G. gt. Depends US visit. 
July 10: Army cleans almost endure batalik area. 
Important Dates: 
February 20 ; Vajpayee visited Lahore. 
May 6 : Infiltration Located 
May 14 : Army begins operation 
May 26 : Air raids started 
June 16 : last date of withdrawal 
AN IN DEPTH ANALYSIS: 
It took two months and many body bags to evict the Pakistani intruders 
from Kargil. Pakistan's adventurism resulted in its diplomatic isolation and 
military defeat. In India the whole nation rallied behind the military's "Operation 
Vijay". The media gave a new meaning and content to the war which get viewed 
in drawing rooms. 
Even as the intrusions have been evicted at great cost and Kargil promises 
to become an election issue, many uncomfortable questions must be answer. How 
did such a deep ingress in a sensitive sector take place, catching us off guard? 
What explains this massive intelligence failure? Have the security parameters in 
the Indo-Pak context been redefined? Were the Indian forces flilly prepared for a 
contingency such as Kargil? What are the lessons we can draw from Kargil? 
Ironically, a government which had laid the greatest stress on national 
security faltered on just this count. Northern light infantry units of Pakistan Army, 
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dressed as "Mujahideen" infiltrated in an area approximately 400 sq. km,. Over an 
80km. Stretch in the Drass-Kargil, batalik belt. The strategy aimed at interdicting 
the sensitive Srinagar - Leh highway to isolated the Ladakh region. 
Simultaneously, Pakistan had intended to launch an offensive in the Trutk 
sector with a view to turn India defenses in Siachen. 
Pakistan's game plan rested on two main parameters. It had hoped that 
when the intrusions were detected, India would not be able to have the aggression 
vacated physically. Pakistan also hoped that the international community mainly 
the US would intervene to prevent the conflict escalating into a nuclear show 
down. Thus, Pakistan would be left with enormous gain was the closest that 
Pakistan had god to avenging its ignominious defeat of 1971. 
LOC. DEMARCATION: 
In attempting to redefine the Loc. in the northern sector, Pakistan army 
would have portrayed a major victory. Pakistan's first attempt to obfiiscate the 
issue was by reiterating the Loc. in the northern area was not fully demarcated. 
The line of control was delineated by militar}' teams from India and Pakistan, 
headed by Lt. Gen. PS. Bhagat, VC and Lt. Gen. Abdul Hameed Khan 
respectively. 
THE SHIMLA AGREEMENT STATES: 
"In Jammu and Kashmir, the Loc. resulting from the cease-fire of 
December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides. 
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A few hundred meters may be, but a blatant intrusion ranging from five to 
eight kms. was downright outrageous, and it took the defence brass almost three 
weeks plan the operation to evict the Pakistanis after the intrusions were detected 
on May 6, 1999. 
DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX OPERATION: 
When the enormity of the situation sunk in, operation viajy was launched 
on May, 26 to flush out the intrudes. 
On May 28 a MI-17 helicopter was targeted by a Stinger missile, killing 
the four crew, causing obvious alarm, the lAF reviewed it operational philosophy. 
Compounding the pilot's problem is the difficulty in identifying small targets like 
bunkers within seconds, because the aircraft must remain for the least time over 
the target area to avoid being shot down. 
The effective use of air power for larger battlefield interdiction was thus 
denied, but even with the stipulated restraints the lAF performed its task of 
softening the objectives and limited targeting of enemy logistic camp and 
columns or our side of the Loc. 
Accord priority by the army was to evict the intrusion fi'om drass sector, 
even as operations were mounted in Batalik towards the last. 
PAKISTAN DIPLOMATICALLY ISOLATED; 
Along with military defeat, Pakistan faced the prospect of diplomatic 
isolation. While Pakistan's brazen aggression had the international community 
ranged against it, India scored diplomatic points by the excise of tremendous 
restraint by not crossing the Loc. 
NUCLEAR BRINKMANSHIP: 
Unrestrained rhetoric and nuclear brinkmanship from Islamabad came in 
sharp contrast to India's restraint. 
This crises could have escalated out of control, including in way that could 
have brought in nuclear weapons, without either party, consciously deciding that 
it wanted to go to nuclear war. 
NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE: 
The need for actionable strategic and tactical intelligence gets reiterated, 
more so in the nuclear context. 
A string of lapses resulted in the intelligence failure. 
At the operational level, routine surveillance and patrolling in winter 
months was reduced. When the snows mehed early this year, the move to 
reoccupy the posts vacated in winter delayed. 
MEDIA WAR: 
The media displayed a sense of responsibility to wait for the war to finish 
until it would start asking uncomfortable questions. It was the media both 
electronic and print which flashed the heroes of many selfless soldiers who 
willingly martyred themselves. 
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LESIONS LEARNT: 
The committee has been asked to "review all events leading to the 
intrusions" and to recommended measures to safeguard to national security. The 
report which this committee will submit in three months is bound to contain the 
following: 
[1] Need for actionable strategic and tactical intelligence. 
[2] Need to augment space-based and battle field surveillance 
capabilities. 
[3] Need for integrated defence intelligence agency. 
[4] Need to formulating intelligence assessments. 
[5] Need to formulate a viable information warfare strategy. 
[6] Streamline procedure for vertical and horizontal dissemination 
information. 
[7] Need to strengthen military diplomatic leverage. 
THE FUTURE: 
The fiiture depends on how seriously we take the lessons thrown up by 
Kargil we have a short memory and do not address national security with the 
seriousness it deserves. 
With a bulk of army units now being pulled out from counter insurgency 
takes for deployment on the Loc, the police and paramilitary forces must upgrade 
their involvement in countering the proxy war. 
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Despite operation Vijay, Pakistan's artillery fire into Kargil continues! By 
choosing not to cross the Loc. we may have set a precedent by which it may cost 
as much more to prevent other Kargil form happening. Which is why we need to 
use diplomacy and military power in the right proportion to acquire maximum 
leverage. 
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withdrawals from certain sector across the line of control had begun. 
Government officials denied reports tha.t Pakistani high commissioner Ashraf 
Jahangir Qazi was meeting foreign secretary. K. Raghunathan with an offer 
for dialogue, saying there was no political movement on the horizon yet. 
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32. 
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14. SUBRAHAMANYAM (K). Shooting down will avertarial Kargils. Economic 
times. 39, 141; 1999, August, 16; 2. 
Pakistan had just carried out the Kargil intrusion. It was still to acknowledge 
officially that it was a regular army operation. The country and the armed 
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taken by the local fighter controller. Air force was alert and would not hesitate 
to deal with any hostile action in accordance with standard operating 
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A 10 kw mobile radio station will be set up in Kargil within the next few 
days. The station can be moved when faced with Pakistani shelling. The 
Doordarshan and AIR stations in Kargil have been destroyed by shillings. 
The current war in Kargil was the first since the television revolution. 
Pakistan had begun the attacks on media by shelling the Kargil stations. 
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16. KHARE(Harish) After Kargil, the debate on autonomy?. The Hindu . 
122,175; 1999,July, 24; 1 
The process of evaluating the two autonomy documents from Jammu and 
Kashmir repon of the state . Autonomy committee concerned with redefining 
the centre-state relationship and the regional autonomy committee report. 
Today we find that the state had lost all resemblance to autonomy. After 
Kargil the political and official establishment would have to address itself to 
the autonomy problem. The Farooq Abdullah Government had appointed a 
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committee under Prof. Riaz Punjabi to examine as how best to operationlise 
the recommendations of the two autonomy reports. In any case the 
controversy only underlines the difficulties in setting the terms of debate over 
the question of autonomy. 
-,-,-, BACKGROUND, WORLD REACTION, POLITICAL 
17. APHC REVIEWED post Kargil scenario. Kashmir opinion. 8, 18; 
1999,August, 8;404-5 
The leaders reviewed the post Kargil scenario in view of recent happenings in 
Kargil and world political reaction in its background. The leaders said that 
Kargil was a minor issue. The ideal issue was Kashmir problem. Such a 
situation had taken place that if the world community did not take stock of the 
basic problem. It would be impossible to avoid the impending calamities of 
war. 
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18. lYER(Shekhar). Kargil over, victory fever grips BJP. The Hindustan times. 
75, 190; 1999, July, 13; 10 
Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee following the military and diplomatic turning 
point into the Kargil mountain war. The party is in the grip of the victory fever 
even though there is a conscions attempt not to show it so early when Pakistan 
can play some new tricks. The end of the Kargil conflict has resulted in public 
opinion in the country in going in favour of Mr. Vajpayee. The BJP leaders 
believe that during the election campaign they will succeed in conveying to 
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the people that the Vajpayee Government reversed the traditional week 
approach of the congress rule by not succumbling to international pressure in 
respect of nuclear tests and missile development to boost India's security. 
-,-,-, BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 
19. MEHTA(Ashok K). Guns of Kargil. Sunday. 26. 26; 1999, July, 3; 46 
The grinding slog in the Kargil ranges for one hillmanship is scaling new 
heights. Mountaineering skills are proving more decisive than pure battle 
craft. The intruders will avoid falling in to the 9-trap, ensuring their 
replenishment and withdrawal routes are kept open. Thirty days after the 
clearance of tololing Ridge, the Kargil battle has reached a crucial stage both 
militarily and politically. Pakistan intrusions are being addressed sector by 
sector, in the priority of thereat and danger, each poses to Kargil. India is 
occupying high moral ground though in Kargil. It is Pakistan who is holding 
dominating height. India should therefore, exploit the enemy's weak political 
and diplomatic flank by isolating it fiirther than what the G-8 has done. India 
will be willing to pick up the threads of bilateral talks including the issue of 
kashmir. 
-,-,-, BI-LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, THIRD PARTY, INVOLVEMENT 
20. CRAZY ABOUT Kargil. Frontier. 32.1; 1999, August, 1-7; 1-2 
The idea was that to talk about bi-lateral negotiations, the more they try to 
involve the so-called third party, to resolve the Kargil vis-a-vis Kashmir 
crisis. The point at issue was the fall out of the Kargil conflict. In all fairness, 
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no political party, left or right was going to oppose the enlaced defense 
budget by the next government. Kargii was going to swell the number of the 
poor on both sides of the line of control because the military establishment in 
the sub-continent will demand more to nurse their morals. 
-,-,-, BUDGET, MILITARY 
21.GAUTAM NAVLAKHA. Kargii: Costs and consequences. Economic and 
political weekly. 34,27; 1999, July, 3; 1747 
What is the price the Government of India wants the country to pay for 
military re- occupying the heights 'lost' in the first place because of the 
government's own folly? The armed intrusion cannot be separated fi"om the 
unresolved territorial dispute with Pakistan and the ongoing militarcy and 
counter- insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. There is talk of increasing the 
military budget for equipping the army. The national security Advisor claimed 
that "one of the lesson we will have to learn; and it is a costly lesson; is that 
we cannot starve the army of essential equipment. 
-,-,-, BURDEN, SECURITY FORCES 
22. BHARDWAJ (Brij). Kashmir battle enters crucial phase. Nation and the 
world.-8. 189; 1999, September, 1; 19-20 
Place was essential between the two countries but it will be wrong to punish 
India for its will restraint and responsible behavior for not enlarging the 
conflict. While the security forces will be doing their job in Jammu and 
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Kashmir, our diplomats will have to wage another battle in world forums. So 
eternal vigil should be our watchword at this crucial juncture. 
-,-,-, BURNING ISSUE 
23. BHARGAVA (GS). Analysing coverage of Kargil conflict. Mainstream. 
37,31;1999July,24;29 
Operation vijay, which has practically come to an end , has been both a test 
and an opportunity for the media including television. The Kargil operations 
have been the most difficult in the last fifty years. Kargil operations on the 
basis of briefing by defence spokespersons in New Delhi have often had their 
own perceptions and priorities. The idea obviously was to create a kind of 
situation in which the security forces will be compelled to resort to the earlier 
techniques of cordon and search with all the attendant risk of human rights 
violation, security forces excesses and international attention and scrutiny. 
-,-,-, BUS DIPLOMACY 
24. DEPANKH. Pakistan at war against India. Third world impact. 60,116,1999, 
August, 8; 34-5 
The Pakistani perceptions about India are influenced by the accumulation of 
hatred generated by the political, military and bureaucratic elites for the last 
50 years. Kargil intrusion may be viewed as a Pakistan attempt to fulfil its 
various objectives. In the wake of Lahore Bus Diplomacy, Pakistan did not 
want Kashmir to remain a bi-lateral issue only. In the context of nuclear 
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weapons, Pakistan would prepare to indulge in limited war with India and not 
allowing the same to acquire. 
-,-,-, COMPARISON, INDIAN FORCE, USA FORCE 
25. JALALI (PN). ISI Link Between taliban and Kargil Adventure. New Age. 47, 
29; 1999, July 18-24; 7. 
Even as Indian security forces registered decisive gains in their drive to oust 
Pakistani Intruders in Kargil, united States imposing tight sanctions against 
Taliban in Afghanistan has come as a surprise development with a direct 
bearing on the present situation in the south-Asian sub-continent. 
-,-,-, CONDITIONS, RESUMPTION NEGOTIATIONS 
26. GAUTAM NAVLAKHA. Demilitarising Kargil: Urgent Talks. Economic and 
Political weeklv. 34, 29; 1999, July, 17; 1979 
Ensuring the inviolability of the line of control requires two things: political 
initiative such as honouring the Delhi Agreement of 1952 and the revival of 
the draft agreement of 1988 that envisaged a pull back and demilitarisation of 
Siachen. The government of India had laid down three conditions for 
resumption of talks with the government of Pakistan: withdrawal of intruders 
by July 16; reaffirmation of the inviolability and sanctity of the line of control 
(loc); and ending sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. 
-,-,-, CONTRIBUTION, ARMY 
27. KOTRU (ML). Kargil Probe best be done by specialists. National Herald. 31, 
146; 1999, August. 4; 1. 
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Kargil saw the worst of times. The guns were still booming, days after the 
Pakistani troops supposedly withdraw, across our frontiers in Kargil and 
elsewhere along the line of control. We have mealy moutned politicians trying 
to make political capital out of the military saga that has been Kargil. It was 
the time when a grateful nation was piraising the sacrifice of 500 ground 
Indians all soldiers, who fought man, machine and nature as few have done 
before. 
-,-,-, CONTRIBUTION, HARYANA 
28. BATURA (RC). It's Kargil all the way. Organiser. 51, 5; 1999, August, 29; 7. 
The Kargil effect was the strongest in Haryana which can boast of the 
maximum number of martyrs in the Kargil conflict. The congress was waiting 
for their leadger to change the trend. The Kargil halo of vajpayee was 
weighing heavily on the minds of the congress, the main opposition in these 
states vajpayee attributed the victory in Kargil to the army and to Jawans who. 
He said, showed exemplary valour in conquering the elements and peaks from 
Pakistan intruders. 
-,-,-,CONTRIBUTION, JAWANS 
29. BHARDWAJ (Brij). Indian Patience in Kargil Rewarde. Nation and the 
World. 8.187:1999, August, 1; 14 
India had to withstand a lot of pressure and exercise control, not to violate the 
line of control, which Pakistan did so blatantly. It also had to pay a heavy 
price in terms of valuable lives of jawans who were killed trying to recapture 
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the mountain heights. The large number of residents of Kargil were displaced 
as a result of the conflict. The defence budget, as a result of the Kargil 
conflict, is likely to rise substantially in India as well as Pakistan. In our 
euphoria of having brought Pakistan to its knees after initial saber-rattling on 
its part, we should not overlook the fact that the Pakistan may yet score a 
"major point by Internationalizing the Kashmir dispute. In India we have relied 
on democratic mechanism to solve our political problems and have presented 
a united front on national issues. 
-,-,-, CONTRIBUTION, MILITANTS 
30. AHMED (Rashid). Master Blasters. Sunday. 26, 26; 1999, July, 3; 50. 
The Kargil conflict and the subsequent militant actions in the valley have 
unmarked a new face of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. The dynamics of 
militancy had changed, and Kargil is the outcome of that change. Earlier, 
militant mobs could be spotted everywhere in the valley and there would be 
daily encounters between militants and security forces. Militants can now use 
Kargil as their operational base. Kargil was the most successful operation in 
the history of kashmiri struggle. That militant scenario as a trailblazing phase 
of militancy. 
-,-,-, CONTRIBUTION, SIKHS 
31. DANG (Satyapal). Badal and Kargil. Mainstream. 37, 40; 1999, September, 
25: 10-11. 
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For long the favourite theme of chief minister Badal was "the congress during 
its 50 years or so of rule after India won independence did nothing except 
indulging in corruption". When the "war like" situation in Kargil was still 
very hot, sardar Badal demanded that punjab's quota in the armed forces 
should be increased because 75% of these martyred in Kargil were sikhs. 
-,-,-, CRUCIAL MEETING 
32.PRAVEEN SWAMI. Army Caught napping. Frontline. 16, 18; 1999, 
September, 10, 33-35. 
The minutes of a crucial meeting of the unified headquarters, the apex body of 
organizations managing security in Jammu and Kashmir show why the initial 
stages of India's response to events in Kargil were confused and direction less 
it makes evident the poverty of the Indian defence establishments conceptual 
and doctrinal thought. 
-,-,-, DEFEAT, PAKISTAN 
33. SAUMITRA MOHAN. Kosovo Vs Kashmir: Implications for India, third 
World Impact. 60, 115; 1999, July; 5-8. 
It would be definitely worth its while to see as to what could be the 
ramifications and repercussions of the Kosovo crisis and its implications for 
India. The non-violent resistance of the cosovar Albanians turned violent and 
kosovo liberation Army accelerated its activities with aid flowing fi'om the 
west. Pakistan does not want to withdraw its army regulars because any such 
39 
move would mean that Pakistan had accepted its defeat in the Kargil 
adventure. 
-,-,-, DEFFICULTIES, ARMY 
34. JHA (Prem Shankar). Grim truth About Kargil outlook. 5, 23; 1999, June, 21; 
10. 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee refers to Kargil as a war like situation 
and not a war. A foreign spokesman described Pakistan's actions as a kind of 
invasion. It was therefore time for us to face some grim facts. First, India was 
not wining the war in Kargil. The army may be doing is making slow progress 
at a huge cost in lives. Second, the fact that Nawaz Sharif and most of the 
Pakistani army generals speak Punjabi, the game plan is obvious. Spotters on 
the heights above Dras and Kargil have directed artillery fire that has 
completely closed the leh road, and forced the evacuation of not only Kargil 
and kaksar but also much of dras. 
-,-,-, DILLI-LAHORE, GOODWILL BUS, NOT SUFFICIENT 
35. FOE IN need is a friend indeed. Combat. 6, 54; 1999, June; 8-9. 
The Dilli-Lahore good will bus had been cruising along comfortably in the 
right direction if not at the desired speed. With elections not so far away in 
India and Nawaz Sharif embroiled in a series of domestic skirmishes, Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee's friend from Lahore could not have done the BJP and 
himself a bigger favour than opening the Kargil front. 
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-,-,-, DIPLOMACY 
36. DUBEY (Muchkund). Kargil crisis: Limits of Diplomacy. Mainstream. 37, 
30; 1999, July, 17; 7.8.30. 
Kargil is an example of Diplomacy. During the last few days diplomacy 
seems to have acquired the centre stage. There ar^ reports on proposals, which 
are being discussed with the US and Pakistan. These moves can seriously 
compromise with our interest and give outsiders a leverage to pursue their 
interest in our region. Indian people have the right to demand answers to these 
questions like India withdrawing from its own territory? Can we realy prevent 
Kargil from being repeated without positioning ourselves along the loc? etc. 
Prime Minister Vajpayee hint to the press persons in Lucknow that a lasting 
solution to the dispute between India and Pakistan would emerge out of the 
present stand off in Kargil. Diplomacy must take a back stage, as the situation 
in Kargil is too complex, sensitive and difficult to be managed by diplomatic 
devices. 
DIPLOMATIC VICTORY 
37. BHANDARA (MP) Kargil: On the edge of the precipice. Nation and the 
world. 8. 188; 1999, August, 16; 18-21. 
At Kargil we halth at the edge of the precipice. There were too many 
surprises. India by not crossing the line of control has secured a notable 
diplomatic Victory. The Kargil freedom fighters are genuine kashmiri 
freedom fighters. If the military on political aim of Kargil was to cut the 
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Indian line of communication to siachen or leh, did any one in his right mind 
not consider that this amounted to a declaration of war with India? that the 
international community would condemn it in no uncertain terms. 
-,-,-, DIPLOMATIC VICTORY 
38. SESHADRI CHARI. Warning that is Kargil. Organiser. 50, 52; 1999, July, 
25; 9. 
The recent diplomatic victory at Kargil may not last long. We must, therefore, 
seize the opportunity to tell the whole world, including some Islamic 
countries, of the danger from terrorism to the civilized world. With the entire 
country heaving a sigh of relief at the successful culmination of the calamity 
that was Kargil. Kargil was a result of the successive congress governments, 
failure to gauge the aggressive Muslim mind set. 
-,-,-, ELECTION ISSUE, BJP 
39. BHARAT PUTRA. Politics of poll surveys. Indian Currents. 11, 36; 1999, 
September, 6-12; 9-13. 
The BJPs claim that it enjoyed the support of the intellectual suffered a body 
blow in these elections in which 7, 848 academicians cast their votes. Neither 
the Kargil victory nor Mr. Vajpayee's splendid performance helped the BJP 
supported candidates. Small worden that Kargil was no longer a comfortable 
issue for the BJP. 
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-,-,-, FINANCIAL BURDEN 
40. JHA (Prem Shankar). Bill for the Kargil war. The Hindu. 122, 171; 1999 July, 
20; 16. 
Indian armed forces success in evicting the Pakistani army and irregulars from 
Kargil. This is where the mounting cost of the Kargil war is being tallied. The 
real financial burden that Kargil has imposed on the country lies in the future. 
The higher threat perception arises from two sobering assessments. The first 
was that in Kargil Pakistan opened an entirely new front that cannot be closed. 
Second was that an entirely new actor has entered the field of high intensity 
conflict. Kargil tax this year to minimise the stain on the budget. Some 
estimates already exist. Making good the present deficiencies of the army 
alone, supplying it with the weapons systems that it has asked for but been 
denied over the past ten years. 
-,-,-, FISCAL POSITION, IMPACT 
4L GOSWAMI (Anupam) and NARULA (Manoj). Disquiet on the western front. 
Business India. 555; 1999, July, 14-27; 46-52 
The government finds itself committed to an increasingly tough line with 
Pakistan as that country shows no sign of curbing its military adventurism in 
Kashmir. So far nothing has been influenced in the economic arena due to the 
ongoing conflict in Kargil. There will be a definite impact on the fiscal 
position of the government thereby pushing up inflation and disturbing the 
capital expenditure programme. Clearly, the BJP led coalition was long way 
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from attaining the commanding heights of managing all the dimension of a 
sustained conflict in Kargil. 
-,-,-, FOREIGN POLICY 
42. RAJ AN (MS), Problems of a democracy. The Hindustan Times. 75, 178; 
1999, July; 1; 13. 
India is less dynamic and active in foreign policy matters than Pakistan. 
Pakistan is seeking ways and means of one upmanship in respect of India. The 
territorial issues, notably Kashmir, is one of them. There is also its constant 
desire to be different from India oi" at least appear to be so. Whenever there is 
suddenly a new crisis, as the Kargil issue, governments wake up and take 
remedial measure, and later sleep over this limitation of all genuinely 
democratic governments. India has been bearing the main brunt of these 
terrorist outfits in Kashmir, Punjab and even in India's North-east states. Of 
course, at present Pakistan has all the trapping of a democratic state, including 
an elected parliament and government. In this respect, Pakistan has a certain 
flexibility and ability to take on initiative. 
-,-,-, FOREIGN RELATION 
43. AJVflT BARUAH. Will loc. be the Indo-Pak. Border. The Hindu. 122, 172; 
1999, July, 21; 8. 
The nuclear factor between India and Pakistan seemed to have worked both 
ways, in encouraging the crisis and also helping to limit it. The line of control 
sanctity, which resonated in the G-8 communique and virtually every 
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statement of key countries, suggests that turning the Hne of control into a de 
jure international border could be the basis along which a solution may be 
sought. Implicit acceptance of the sanctify of the line of control without the 
qualifying without prejudice to its position represented an avoidable dilution 
of Pakistan's declaratory position. Pakistan's loss of nerve in handling the 
Kargil crisis had implications for other vita national security issues. Kargil 
affairs has exposed systematic flaws in a decision-making process. 
-,-,-, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
44. AYAZ AMIR. Pakistan's Kargil folly. Organiser. 50, 52; 1999, July, 25, 9. 
The Washington statement was a model of clarity which nails Pakistan's 
humiliation to the must and leaves nothing to the imagination. Kargil 
operation could have made some senses. As an attempt at permanently 
occupying the Kargil heights it was madness if only because no country, 
whether India or Pakistan would tolerate such a naked trespass into territory 
under its control. The people of Pakistan were not surprised. They were 
sturmed because this was not what they had been led to expect. 
-,-,-, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
45. ELLIOTT (John). Just a small Skirmish in Kashmir? New Statesman. ; 1999, 
June, 7, 10. 
Atal Bihari Vajpayeie made his dramatic peace making bus trip to the 
Pakistani city of Lahore to meet Nawaz Sharif, his Pakistani counterparts. 
Sharif was internationalising Kashmir by underlining that it was the central 
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issue in India-Pakistan relations. India wants to put Kashmir to one side and 
build friendship initially on other, less sensitive issues. It may have been 
persuaded Islamabad to step up its involvement on the grounds that the world 
would have to take notice and prevent escalation. 
-,-,-, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
46. WAR IN the making. Indian Currents. 11, 23; 99, June, 7-13, 10-11. 
The Vajpayee Sharif meeting was supposed to be the dawn of a detente in 
Indian Pakistan ties, but peace and stability seem to drift away from India 
Pakistan relations. The conflict will turn out to be a fight between the Hindu 
Agenda of the Vajpayee government and the Islamic agenda of the Sharif 
government. 
-,-,-, FOREIGN RELATIONS-US 
47. VISWAM (S). Pakistan Cannot Get Away With Kargil Misadventure. 
Mainstream. 37, 25; 1999, June, 12; 5-6. 
The demonstrative tendency towards assertion and emphasis is a fall out from 
favourable international reaction to New Delhi's position and conduct in 
relation to the Pakistan aggression. The extent of speculating that the 
government may be becoming more dependent on the united states to pressure 
Pakistan to end the Kargil situation. To secure a commitment from Pakistan 
that it will vacate the aggression on its own, failing which India will end it 
Pakistani regulars are the nucleus of the intruding force and that only a 
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sprinkling of irregulars had participated in the infiltration. Pakistan should not 
be allowed to get away with its misadventure in Kargil. 
-,-,-, FORWARD POLICY, INDIA'S FUTURE 
48. DESHPANDEY (Anirudh). Option in Kargil: half forward policy. Economic 
and political weekly. 34, 29; 1999, July, 17; 1978. 
An adventurous forward policy involving either the crossing of the line of 
control. The permanent occupation of high peaks or even the liberation of Pok 
(Pakistan occupied Kashmir), urged by some right-wing politicians, should be 
eschewed in favour of exercising military caution and bringing greater 
international diplomatic pressure on Islamabad. A forward policy on the line 
of control in Kashmir. Appears unfeasible in the foreseeable future. India was 
left with two courses of action in the event of facing a protracted mountain 
war. The first was a backward policy which, compounded with unpardonable 
intelligence failures. The second was nourished by the complacence. 
-,-,-, FUTURE, KASHMIR 
49. BAJPAI (Kunti), Here's one solution to Kashhiir. The Hindustan Times. 75, 
202; 1999, July, 25; 11. 
Converting the line of control into an international boundary as pat of a formal 
partition of Kashmir appears distinctly achievable compared to the 
alternatives. We finally come to an agreement with Pakistan on the future of 
Kashmir, their will indeed be' more Kargils. Would Pakistanis accept the line 
of control solution? Today, that possibility seems remote, but a combination 
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of factors may well work to change their minds: defeat in Kargil, diplomatic 
isolation over Kashmir: India's success in wearing out the militancy; 
Pakistan's economic and internal social difficulties; and the unwillingness of 
the mass of Pakistanis to get involved in a foil scale war with India, if there is 
a silver lining to the Kargil war. It is that we have been given a moment to 
return to the debate over the future of Kashmir. 
-,-,-, FUTURE PLANNING 
50. VASM (S. Ausaf Saied). What after Kargil? Radiance. 34, 27; 1999, July, 
25-31; 6-7. 
It was neither India nor Pakistan which has emerged victorious. It was the 
united states which has succeeded in getting its long cherished foothold in our 
region to take on china eventually. In this article some things have been 
discussed like unpleasant Interjection, painful amusement , why self 
deception, govt, considering Kargil tax, gains dilution and in comfortable 
peace. 
-,-,-, GENERAL VIEWS, BJP 
51. PRAVEEN SWAMI. Now, the cover-up Frontline. 16,16; 1999, August, 13; 
22. 
Army officials now claim that the occupation of line of control posts in the 
Kargil area. Several observers believe that the cost intensive operation now 
planned at Kargil is an exercise in deflecting blame. Although India's 
successes in the Kargil campaign are a tribute to the soldiers who fought 
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against all odds, the United States authored end of the war is no triumph for 
the government. Bharatiya Janta Party led coalition government working 
overtime to turn army command position into branch offices of the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh, But with an election campaign just rounds the comer, 
the BJP finds it imperative to sustain the myth that the Kargil war has been an 
unequivocal triumph. The largest emerging area of controversy is why 
specific intelligence warnings of an intrusion last autumn were not acted upon 
by the Brigade at Kargil and the command structure. 
-,-,-, fflSTORY, BURNING ISSUE 
52. PURI (Balraj). Kargil in Perspective of Indo-Pak conflicts. Janta. 54, 15; 
1999, August, 1;4-11. 
In this article mostly history of the Kargil has been emphasized, like in 1947, 
overwhelming popular support helped Indian army to drive out the Pakistan 
sponsored tribal radians and regulars of Pakistan simply collapsed in 1965, in 
1972. Pakistan simply collapsed as one entity. In 19 tees Kashmir valley 
witnessed mass anti India unsurge of militancy. By calling intruders in Kargil 
as freedom fighters, the leaders of the Azadi movement have damaged their 
won cause and lost much of the international and liberal Indian sympathy. 
-,-,-, IMAGE, NAWAZ SHARIF 
53. WHO REALLY run Pakistan? The Economist. 351, 8125; 1999, June, 26; 29-
30. 
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A question over the country's leadership emerges as the battle in Kashmir 
continues neither side retreating either military or diplomatically. Nawaz 
Sharif s image of omnipotence had been called into question by the violent 
dispute with India over Kashmir. Mr. Sharif s plan for converting implease 
into victory side to depend on the rest of the world. Pakistan claims as well 
that India was occupying territory at two points on its side of the line of 
control. Mr. Sharif used his powers clumsily. Mr. Sharif may be in Change of 
Pakistan, but will Pakistan survive. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, BUDGET 
KARGIL CONFLICT, INDIA, PAKISTAN, IMPACT 
54. AFTER KASHMIR. The Economist. 352, 8126; 1999, July, 3; 15-16. 
India and Pakistan the world's two newest nuclear powers, to end their 
fighting in disputed Kashmir, the casualties mount. But now Pakistan has 
miscalculated too. Far from winning international help over Kashmir, it was 
suddenly the friendless one. Thus far India, it has earned high marks from 
America for prudently restricting its military operations against the intruders 
to its side of the line of control. 
55. RUKMINIPARIHASHRATHY. Warring Over the Wisdom of A Kargil cess. 
Business India. 813; 1999, August, 7-21; 20-21. 
The war is over. Now come the taxes, being the Battle of the Budget. From an 
initial dismissal of war related expenditure as sunk costs that were already 
captured. Does that warrant a Kargil cess? Kargil can be absorbed by the 
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budget. A war tax was only an opportune cover for a larger fiscal problem. 
There was a bulge in military spending, as a result of the bunching of 
acquisitions, it was followed by a balance of payment crisis. 
-,-,-,]MPACT, INDO-PAK TRADE 
56. BHARADWAJ (Ajay). Kargil puts a brake on Indo-Pak trade. The Times of 
India. 162, 156; 1999, July, 1; 10. 
Kargil operation have taken a heavy tall on Indo-Pakistan trade taking place 
through the wagaha border. The trade between the two countries has 
practically come to a standstill. The adverse trade conditions between the two 
countries has affected more than 500 traders in both the countries the decline 
in trade between the two countries will be more detrimental to Pakistan's 
economy because in the last two years, the trade balance was its favour due to 
bulk sugar imports by India. Exports and imports from Pakistan have become 
unfeasible since Pakistan has ceased to provide wagons. Both countries make 
goods wagon available to their respective traders under the inter change 
scheme for exports. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, KASHMIRIS 
57. KOTRU (M.L.). Time to expose Pak sponsored terrorism. National Herald. 
31, 137; 1999, July, 26; 1. 
The members states will be asked yet again to put an end to the reign of 
terrors let loose on poor kashmiris by the barbarous Indian tropps. In the end 
Kargil saw the Pakistani leadership earning into laurels but so much egg on 
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their faces. If we allow over self to be lulled into inaction by our own political 
reoccupation's we will be guilty of missing a very fine opportunity of further 
exposing Pakistan's duplicity. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, PAKISTAN 
58. AGHA (Qamar). Pakistan After Kargil. The Hindu. 122, 182; 1999, August, 
2; 10. 
Pakistan's misadventure in Kargil will have far-reaching consequences for its 
internal as well as external affairs Pakistan's action in Kargil will boomerang 
and result in a greater crisis at home, and in its isolation in the international 
community. The economic condition in Pakistan was not good because 
Pakistan was facing an economic crunch due to a fall in oil prices. Pakistan 
will be totally dependent on the United States for economic and political 
support. Pakistan has developed a unique arrangement whereby the army and 
the clergy are involved in managing national affairs. Pakistan also finds itself 
unable to reconcile with the minorities. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, NAWAZ SHARIF 
59. METHTA (Ashok K). Kargil After Kargil. Sunday. 26, 32; 1999, August, 8-
14; 44-45 
After Kargil, the governments principal adversary is the Jaamat-e-Islami and 
its leader, Qazi Husain Ahmed. Nawaz Sharif is still themost powerfiil leader 
in Pakistan. There is no threat of army take over now or in the near fliture. But 
Kargil was a big blow for the army and Nawaz Sharif The additional 
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commitment of Indian troops to prevent future breaches of line of control will 
automatically result in an increased deployment of Pakistan forces along the 
line of control. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, NAWAZ SHARIF 
60. RAJ CHENGAPPA. Sharif s Midlife Crisis. India Today. 24, 36; 1999, 
September, 6; 52-9. 
With a stagnant economy, waning popularity and the opposition itching to 
oust him, the Pakistan prime-Minster faces his mot serious challenge halfway 
through his tenure. Sharif has to walk a treacherous path. It was situation that 
can test even the best of politicians. In the past, Sharif has shown that he was 
capable of taking tough decisions and battling against great odds. Sharif has 
also been going out of his may to pacify the army which was upset that it had 
to take much of the flak for the Kargil misadventure. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, TOURISM 
61. PANDEY (Manesh). Kargil no damper on tourist in flow. The Times of India. 
7, 30; 1999, July, 11; 1. 
The guns booming in Kargil, Indian tourism could have gone. Travelers 
world-wide have always turned their back on India whenever conditions were 
hot congenial. But the picture is quite different. Tourist are coming, though 
Kashmir may not be a hot spot for many-a positive sing for the inations 
ambitious explore India year. Kargil's impact on tourism is negligible though 
prospect in Jammu and Kashmir received prillcnnium a few setbacks, tourism 
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business all over the country is growing. And the fact that the Kargil was has 
come during the lean season has not really altered the picture too much. 
Japanese tourist were earlier reluctant to visit India following the nuclear tests. 
-,-,-, IMPACT, TOURISM 
62. YUSUF JAMEEL. Return to the tenision. Blitz on Sunday. 59, 81; 1999, July, 
18; 29. 
Growing tension created by the breakout of hostilities in Kargil droue tourist 
out of Kashmir and those intending to spend summer holiday in the valley 
cancelled their trips resulting in alarming decline in revenue through the trade. 
Authorities will not take chance with regard to providing foolproof security 
cover to the pilgrimage. Tourism, medical, revenue and other officials and 
workers are arriving here to perform their duty towards smooth conduct of 
another yatra. 
-,-,-,IMPACT, WORLD 
63. GURMEET KANWAL. Kargil. Seminar. 479; 1999, July, 5; 15-18. 
By sending heavily armed foreign mercenary and army soldiers across the loc. 
into Kargil district to physically occupy territory on the Indian side. The 
underlying cause behind the military misadventure was the Pakistani military 
establishment had become frustrated with India's success in containing the 
militancy in Jammu & Kashmir to with manageable limits. Pakistan's military 
misadventure has gone horribly womg. The world has refused to accept 
Pakistani propaganda that Kashmiri militants have infihrated across the loc. 
54 
The very important lesson to emerge from the ongoing Kargil 99 imbroglio is 
that a country cannot afford to laid down its guard on matters as important as 
national security. 
-,-,-, IMPORTANCE, SATELLITE CHANNELS 
64. MEDIA AND the Kargil conflict. Indian Currents. 11, 33; 1999, August, 16-
22; 29-20. 
In fact India has woefully failed in realizing the strategic importance of 
credible media support to win over the local people thanks to independent 
satellite channels, India today cold simultaneously network with global power 
and reach out into Pakistan with a lot more credibility. Media coverage of the 
Kargil conflict has been linked in the country at large. The media has done a 
good job in galvanizing the nation. 
-,-,-, INDIAN ARMED FORCES, LOC. 
65. SHAMEEM FAIZEE. Pak Aggression in Kargil Sector: Take nation into 
confidence. New Age. 47, 23; 1999, June, 6-12; 1 
In this article author said that our heart goes to the brave Jawans and military 
officials who are making supreme sacrifices to safeguard the nation and its 
territorial integrity against all the odds in the Kargil sector of jammu and 
Kashmir state. Long operation to flush out the Pakistani infiltrators who have 
penetrated from five to ten kilometers inside the Indian side of the line of 
Control, the Indian Armed forces have lost 49 Jawans and over 50 have 
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received grave injuries. About a dozen are missing. Over ten thousand 
civilians have been forced to migrate to find shelter. 
-,-,-, INDIAN ARMY 
66. PRAVEEN SWAMI. War in Kargil. Frontline, 16, 12; 1999, June, 5-12; 4. 
The war in Kargil, despite the use of combat aircraft, seems set to be a long 
one. Pakistani irregulars and troops have been vacated from lower heights in 
several areas, but re-supply lines elsewhere remain open. Although Indian 
Army has occupied several ridge lines in the Drass, Kaksar and Batalik areas. 
There is a need for introspection on why Kargil snow balled into a grave 
embarrassment for India in the first place. Indian army to realize just how 
serious the situation was. Fresh sightings of tents and makeshift rock and ice 
bunkers kept coming in, until it became clear that Pakistani irregulars and 
troops were occupying 70 positions on heights along the national highway. 
-,-,-, INFILTRATORS, BSF 
67.VIKR.\M JIT SING. Pak has smuggled in almost three battalions of 
intruders. The Indian Express. 67, 229; 1999, June, 26; 5. 
There was not a single dominating heights where infiltrators are not being 
found. If it is over a highway, it might have a 100. Although the army was by 
passing the heights which are thinly held so as to concentrate on those 
dominating highways, eventually these, too, will have to be cleared. The 
Talibans had been confirmed by the radio intercepts. 
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-,-,-, INFILTRATORS, LOC. 
68. GGP. Propose Kargil. Janta. 54, 11; 1999, June, 6; 2-10. 
A large number of regulars and irregulars intrude intrusion was taking place 
every year for the past ten years, but the number of intruders was much larger 
this year into our side of line of control and take possession. When our Jawan 
were fighting and some of them were dying we were busy taking pride infect 
that the many making was not affected, 
-,-,-, INFILTRATORS LOC. 
69. SHARIF'S STICKY wicket. The Economist. 352, 8127; 1999, July, 10, 21, 
After his regular weekend cricket match in Lahore, Nawaz Sharif suddenly 
dashed off to Washington . Mr. Sharif essentially agree to withdraw 
Pakistanis support for the infiltrators, many of whom are thought to be 
regular Pakistani troops, who have crossed into India's side of the line of 
control, which divides Kashmir. Mr. Sharif had to worry about other 
nationalists, including some of his own armed forces. There was no evidence 
of a withdrawal. A counter attack by Pakistani forces had to be repelled. 
Even if Pakistan's prime minister can overcome his hard-liners and restore 
some kind of peace in Kashmir. 
-,-,-, INFILTRATORS, SRINAGAR 
70. VIVAYK (Ramesh). Nasty Surprise. India Today. 24, 22; 1999, May, 31; 31-
2. 
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Pakistan backed infiltrators occupy snow bound heights overlooking the 
srinagar - leh highway hear Kargil, triggering a massive response by the 
army. The army has paid the price for apparently not heeding intelligence 
reports. The Pakistani action could compel India to reconsider its diplomatic 
strategy. Pakistan seems determined to raise the level of militancy there by 
pushing in mercenaries. 
-,-,-, INTELLINGENCE AGENCIES COORDINATION 
71. RAJ CHENGAPPA and HARINDER BAWEJA. Is the Army Covering up? 
India Today. 24, 37; 1999, September, 13; 70-73. 
After the triumph, the brass was now being accused of glossing over reports 
that show they may have ignored warnings about a Pakistani build up in 
Kargil. The army holds that IB reports warned of infltation and not such a 
massive enemy intrusion. While the army cannot absolve itself of the blame, 
what also comes through was the complete lack of coordination among the 
intelligence agencies. 
-,-,-, INTERNATIONALISATION 
72. KALRA (CS). Kargil Over, Stay tuned for More News... University Today. 
19, 14; 1999, July, 15; 12. 
The Kashmir issue has been internationalized as never before Kargil has been 
a monumental command and intelligence failure. Command failure happened 
because those commanding the heights with their troops remained blissiully 
unaware of what was happening there on the tiger tops after the snow melted 
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early this year. The government by a senile acceptance and approval of the 
hollow intervention of the united states had already internationalized the 
Kashmir issue. 
-,-,-, INTERNATIONALISATION 
73. MEHRA (OP). Pakistan took Advantage of over Psyche. Rashtriva Sahara. 
7,3; 1999, July; 33-34. 
It was time Indian as a nation undertook serious introspection to evolve 
policies suiting the environment and character of our neighbours. Pakistan's 
aim was to forcibly go after the line of control and internationalize Kashmir 
one again not with standing the sanctity of agreements and professions of 
friendship. The sacrifices, pain and suffering which wars or war like 
conditions impose on the families of those of India who unhesitatingly shed 
their blood, were forgotten. 
-,-,-, INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, MAY 
74. HARRISON (Sella). Don't feed war hungry pak. Politics India. 4, 1; 1999, 
July; 5-6. 
American officials privately acknowledge that India scored an intelligence 
coup when it intercepted a May 29 international telephone conversation 
between General Musharaf and the Chief of the General staff in Islamabad. 
Lieutenant general Mohammed Aziz. A transcript of the conversation leaves 
little doubt as to the authenticity of the intercept. Freedom fighters, who 
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seized strategic positions along the key Kargil sector of the cease fire Hnc 
were organized and equipped by Pakistani intelligence agencies. 
-,-,-, INTRUSION 
75. KARGIL WAR ends. Kashmir Opinion. 8, 16; 1999, July, 25; 346-7. 
An Indian army spokesman had declared that all the infiltrators were 
completely out and the entire area was free of intrusion. We have put up white 
flag and so have they. Have said even as Pakistan set the intruders had not 
come to its side of the Une of control and it had no knowledge about their 
whereabouts about leaving Kargil. 
-,-,-, ISSUE, JAMMU AND KASHMIR, SOLUTION 
76. GERA (YK). Crystal Gazing: Beyond Kargil. Third World Impact. 60, 116; 
1999, August, 1; 12-15. 
The Kargil operations have been going on for sometime. The event were 
recent and therefore, need no reiteration. A policy of confrontation with India 
only weakens the political leadership of Pakistan to the benefit of the other 
two power centres, like the military leadership and the religions extremist 
forces further may be no normalcy of relations with Pakistan without solving 
the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. 
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-,-,-, JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
77. KAUL (Sumir). Pak Infiltration bid Scuttled, Economic Time. 39, 129; 1999, 
August, 2; 2. 
Army troops scuttled a major infiltration bid by Pakistan to send armed 
militants into Jammu and Kashmir. The heavily armed militants, who had 
entered Indian territory fi-om Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Kargil residents 
were again gripped with panic when Pakistani troops resorted to unprovoked 
firing Pakistani shell shave found their way in Kargil town. 
-,-,-, KASHMIRIS 
78. DAVID DEVADAS. After Kargil, it's time to conqurer hearts. Business 
Standard. 24, 350; 1999, July, 15; 7. 
There was palpably greater hostility against India in the valley this summer. 
There was a real danger that, a mid the euphoria at having won battles for the 
barren heights in Kargil, India might lose the basic war for the hearts and 
minds of Kashmiris. Now that the Kargil front has been won, the battalions 
that were withdrawn from anti-militancy operation must return as soon as 
possible. The forces to behave like an occupation force was "turning even 
pro-Indian kashmiris into Pakistanis "as a young village women remarked 
angrily. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTORT 
79. AGHA (Qasim). Crisis in Kargil Nation and the World 8, 185; 1999, July, 1; 
38. 
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India has expectedly sent its reinforcements to the area and declared that it 
wil not rest until the infiltrators are evicted. Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee has conveyed to Islamabad that the conflict in Kargil may be 
peaceflilly settled if Pakistan ends the intrusion and respects the line of 
control. The Pakistan incursion in Kargil region is a strategic move with an 
eye on the siachen area as well. So the Kargil intrusion is a well planned 
move on the part of Pakistan to capture the strategic heights through armed 
incursion to cut off Srinagr Leh highway. If Pakistan accepts the Indian 
demand to roll back from the Kargil sector then it will have to face 
opposition from the security forces and the militant Islamic organizations. 
The western nations, have rejected the Pakistan moves to raise the Kashmir 
issue in United Nations, and advised the Nawaz Sharif Government to 
negotiate the dispute with India. 
-,-,-,LINE OF CONTROL 
80. BHARDWAJ (Brij). Who is responsible for the mess in Kargil. Nation and 
the World. 8, 185; 1999, July, 1; 36. 
In 1965 when, for the first time, Pakistan had sent thousands of irregulars 
across the cease-fire line ia Jammu and Kashmir. Heavy casualties and loss 
of aircraft, etc. indicate the size of the conflict that is raging. The first failure 
to detect movement across the line of control was made worse by our 
inability to take appropriate action after the discovery of intruders on our 
soil. In such circumstances, the false sense of confidence displayed by the 
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government either as a result of nuclear explosion or because of bus 
diplomacy to say the least amounts to criminal neglect. India should prepare 
itself for new kind of insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir. So bus 
diplomacy, power agreement with Pakistan and providing sweeteners for the 
Pakistani Prime Minister in terms of sugar imports may be justified at a 
certain level but at the same time we also need to prepare ourselves to meet 
fresh challenges everyday. 
-,-,- LINE OF CONTROL 
81.BHATIA (Sunen). Myth of diplomatic success and mystery of Kargil war 
exploded. New thinking Communist. 10, 15; 1999, August. 24; lO-U. 
The intruders were driven out from Indian soil along the line of control in 
Kargil sector, but shelling and shooting over the line of control continued not 
only in Kargil but in many other sectors of the line of control in Kashmir 
mutually agreed to by both India and Pakistan. This was the most distressing 
tragedy that afflicts India's national life of which no palliative relief, much 
less a way out, can be envisaged in the near future. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL 
82. DASGUPTA (Swapan). Diplomacy after Kargil: Formalise the Partition of 
Kashmir. India Today. 24, 27; 1999, July, 5; 39. 
India and Pakistan would have buried the hatchet long ago. After five weeks 
of mountain warfare, it is no longer Indian Politicians who are in the 
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forefront of hawkish attitudes. Post Kargil, India must indicate its 
willingness to accept the line of Control as the extension of the Redcliffe. 
The line of control has become the bottom line of a solution to this particular 
war. At the same time, it is widely acknowledged in officials circles so that 
the suggestion that Indian forces must cross. The line of control to enlarge 
the scope of the war has gripped the popular imagination. It is entirely 
concievable that this year's adventurism in Kargil will be repeated in other 
ways in subsequent years. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL 
83. RAJ (MP), Kargil: factor myth. Indian currents. 11,23; 1999, June, 17-24; 14-
16. 
When India was justifying its recent military build up along the line of 
control as part of the extended to flush out infiltrators, the Pakistani 
leadership views the latest developments as a preparation for an extended 
military conflict by India. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL 
84. SURJEET (Harkishan Singh). Kargil situation takes new turn. People's 
Democracy. 23, 28; 1999, July, 11; 1-10. 
American President Clinton and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
shared views that the current fighting in the Kargil region of Kashmir was 
dangerous and contains the seeds of a wider conflict. It was made clear that 
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the protection of the line of control means withdrawal of all forces by 
Pakistan from the territory on the Indian side of the line of control. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, MILITARY ACTION 
85. MANOJ JOSHI. War over peace. India Today. 24. 28; 1999, July, 12; 37. 
Military action may not be the only solution available to clear Pakistani 
intruders from the Indian side of the line of control. The two countries seem 
to be on the verge of a withdrawal deal, but with passions running high on 
both sides it could get complicated. India does not seem terribly keen to offer 
Pakistan the face saving formula it wants; a cease-fire leading to the 
intruders withdrawal. The Pakistani adventure in Kargil can become that 
country's crowning blunder. The measured Indian response and the 
international support for the sanctity of the line of control could well aid in 
bolstering India's 50 year of old grand strategy in Kashmir. With the public 
mood favouring an even tougher military approach, the government does not 
want to confront a backlash prior to the general election. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, ORIGIN 
86. SAHT KUMAR. The line of control (LoC ): The line of restraint. CHRANIC. 
10,2; 1999, August; 12-14. 
Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and her Pakistani counterpart Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto at Simla in July 1972 was that the so-called cease-fire line of 
December 17, 1971 between India and Pakistan, to be named the line of 
control and this line of control be allowed to evolve as the International 
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boundary between the two neighbours. The Indian security forces and 
intelligence network also failed to maintain a hawk-like vigil on the borders. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, ROLE, AIRFORCE 
87. JAYARAMU (PS). Managing the Kargil conflict. India is on the right track. 
Mainstream. 37, 29; 1999, July, 10; 7-8. 
The Kargil conflict began from some infiltration by regular members of the 
Pakistan Army. It appears that contrary to what is generally believed, the 
Pakistani intrusion may not have been a case of total intelligence failure. It 
is the diplomatic and military aspects of the management of the conflict by 
India that should engage our attention now. Militarily speaking, the decision 
of the Indian authorities to use the Air force was timely and productive. The 
air operations surely reduced the time taken for effectively dealing with the 
Pak forces. Government has taken the right decision to suspend air strikes in 
areas where the Pakistani forces are close to the line of control, as air 
operations in such plans might result in Indian fighter planes crossing the 
LoC. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, ROLE, INDIA 
88. BHARAT KARNAD. Using LoC, to India's Advantages. Economic and 
Political Weeklv. 34, 28; 1999, July, 10; 1869. 
The opportunity provided for territorial aggrandisement by the nature of the 
line of control, which is elastic, is apparently better appreciated by Pakistan 
than by India. India's view of the line of control has been one of 
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complacency leading to contradictory Indian policies. The transient 
boundary, involving disputed territory, therefore, does not enjoy the 
protection of International law or the sanctity of an International border. The 
understanding between India and Pakistan to be , the fact is that most of the 
world considers the line of control as nothing more than a cease fire line 
pending a final solution. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, ROLE, INDIAN MILITARY 
89. RAGHAVAN (VR). Larger purpose in Kargil. New thinking communits. 10, 
9; 1999, June, 25,; 12-14. 
There was meaningful progress towards a military resolution of the Kargil 
situation. The first and cardinal Indian interest to be ensured after Kargil was 
the status of the line of control. The Kargil aggression has inevitably ended 
the good faith and trust, which was pains takingly buih over the few year. 
There was need for clarity of the purpose to be achieved by the operations 
being conducted by the Indian military in Kargil. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, ROLE, PAKISTAN 
90. KAUL (Shyam). Line of Control-not for Pakistan. National Herald. 31, 157; 
1999, August, 15; 1. 
LoC (line of control) was being transgressed every day by Pakistan. 
Pakistani infiltrations and Mercenaries were creating trouble, and they must 
stop it. The exchange of fire between Pakistani and Indian troops was still 
continuing along the line of control. When Pakistan was forced to withdraw 
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from Kargil and go beyond line of control, we did mean the LoC. just in 
Kargil, but the entire line of control. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, VffiW, PAKISTAN 
9LRAJARAM (NS). LoC; Move on to the Sindhu. Organiser. 51, 3; 1999, 
August, 15; 9-11. 
Defeating terrorism, not defending the line of control, should be the top 
priority. There was not sanctity to the present line of control. This defensive 
frame of mind on India's part has handed the initiative to Pakistani terrorists. 
Just as plebiscite has become obsolete - a position accepted by the world -
the line of control has also become obsolete. Since Pakistan sees the line of 
control as a barrier to its terrorist expansion, the civilized world must sees it 
as the boundary between civilization and barbarism. 
-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, VIEWS, VAJPAYEE (Atal Bihari) 
92. MALHOTRA (Jyoti). LoC. as border: Government sees the Kashmir ray of 
light. The Indian Express. 67, 234; 1999, July, 1; 1-9. 
Prime Minsiter A.B. Vajpayee at the meeting in Lucknow rejected the idea 
again that the army would cross the line of control to resolve the Kargil 
crisis. The government was actively debating the issue of converting the line 
of control into an international boundary. Highly placed sources in the 
government confirmed that the Kargil crisis had imparted a definite edge to 
the line of control conversion debate, with the cabinet committee on security 
discussing it; on and off 
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-,-,-, LINE OF CONTROL, VAJPAYEE (Atal Bihari) 
93. MALIK (VP). Military action in Kargil. Kurukshetra. 47, 11; 1999, August, 
23-26, 
The militaty action in Kargil should be as part of a continuing pattern of 
Pakistani involvement in Jammu and Kashmir. The action moved to the other 
parts of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in selected districts of Jammu and 
in the regions adjoining the line of control. India's Prime Minister Mr. Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee said that Indians were determined that the military action 
will not be stopped or scaled back until the intruders have been driven 
away... We are making no secret deals and no proposals or mediation by 
third countries will b^e accepted. In short, nothing but the complete and 
unconditional withdrawal of the intruders will satisfy our requirements. 
-,-,-, LINK, ARMY, MUJAHIDEEN 
94. JHA (Prem Shankar). Lahore Process in danger. The Hindustan Times. 75, 
207; 1999, July, 30; 13. 
There is also a growing danger that the lower orders of the armed forces will 
do the same. The Kargil misadventure has turned the fundamentalist state 
form and also ran into a serious contender for power. The domestic 
repercussions in Pakistan of the Kargil war may have killed the Lahore 
process This is because while India has emerged from the wax v^th the 
capacity almost completely destroyed. The links that exist between the army 
and the Mujahiddin and enhance legitimacy of the fundamentalist state. The 
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more Pakistan drifts in that direction, the more will the prospect of a 
negotiated settlement fade away. 
-,-,-,LOSE, MEN, MATERIAL 
95. KANWAR SANDHU. Military truism dawning on Army and Kargil. The 
Indian Express. 67, 231; 1999, June, 28; 5. 
The importance of the surprise element and the military truism of mountains 
eating up troops is dawning on the Army. Kargil conflict surpasses Siachen 
in Terms of Manpower and equipment losses. The attrition rate in terms of 
men and material is very high, there is a material difference. While India has 
lost a number of officers, all Pakistani casualties from its army are either 
Jawans, now commissioned officers or Junior Commissioned officers 
besides the irregulars. 
-,-,-, MIGRANTS 
96. MISRA (Smita). Delayed relief causes more harm to Jammu Migrants. 
Financial Express. 3, 4; 1999, August, 15; 8. 
Fear of epidemics, adulterated food and no rehabilitation in sight has created 
uncertainty amongst that migrants affected by firing in border areas. Some 
non-government and voluntary organizations have risen to the occasion and 
introduced mobile Medicare facilities in the camps. Migrants have 
strengthened their resolve to not return home, unless a lasting solution was 
found to the crisis. 
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-,-,-,MISBEHAVE, SECURITY FORCES 
97. GAUTAM NAVLAKHA. Internal war and Civil Right: Disappearances in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Economic and Political weekly. 34, 24; 1999, June, 12-
18; 1491-2. 
The recent Amnesty International report examines the phenomenon of 
disappearances in Jammu and Kashmir. While some of the missing may have 
crossed the border, by far the larger number have fallen victim to state 
terrorism -arrest, detention, torture and death at the hands of the security 
forces. Courts caimot provide much relief as court orders are ignored by 
bureaucrats and armed forces. 
-,-,-, MUJAHIDEEN 
98. AHMAR MUSTI KHAN. Foreign hand. The week. 17, 34; 1999, August, 8; 
51. 
The breeding ground for Kashmir bound mjuahidieen are the religions 
seminaries in Pakistan. The offices of the mujahidlen groups are LoCated 
near them. Mujahideen claim of support from Kargil and Dras inhabitants is 
follow. There is no lone lost between the communities. In the mid 90's, the 
mujahideen outfits involved in Kargil were engendering. The main 
recruitment grounds for the mujahideen are in the Punjab and frontier 
provinces. In the frontier, the most fertile breeding ground for the 
mujahideen are Bajaur Agency, Malakand, Dir and Chitral areas. 
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-,-,-, MUJAHTDEEN, LOC 
99. SHAHID AHMED K H A N . Pak to appeal for Mujahideen withdrawal. 
Economic Times. 39, 107; 1999, July, 7; 1, 
Pakistan said it would appeal to the so called Mujahideens to withdraw from 
the Indian side of the line of control as they had already achieved their 
objective of bringing the Kashmir issue to the centre of International stage. 
There was no question of withdrawal of Pakistani forces as they have not 
crossed the line of control. The Indian military actions in Kargil sector 
against the Kashmiri mujahideens, who were controlling the Kargil heights, 
led to an unprecedented escalation by India all along the line of control. 
-,-,-, NATIONALISATION 
100. PAMELA. The shadow of a martyr. Indian Currents. 11, 36; 1999, 
September, 6-12; 30-34. 
BJP chooses a war wider to spread its message in an attempt to capitahze on 
post Kargil patriotic fervour. The wave of nationalistic feeling generated by 
the Kargil conflict. This spring fond its most intense expression at the 
funerals of slain Indian sold, and border guards. Whose lighted pyres 
transformed 100 of home towns into emblems of national grief 
-,',-,NATION.\L SECURITY 
lOL FLORY (Keith). War begins how. The Statesman. 140, 172; 1999, July, 
23; 9. 
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Kargil was a wake upcall. If it does not shock those in authority into giving 
national security the attention it requires, all those young men would have 
shed their blood for nothing. The quibbling over whether it was a failure of 
intelligence or just shortcoming in surveillance, or precisely when the 
intruders took up position would be as pointless as it could be endless. 
-,-,-,NEED, PEACEFUL SOLUTION 
102. KARGIL HAS left Bitter memories. Kashmir Opinion. 8, 18; 1999, 
August, 8; 403-404. 
Kargil war was the climax of ten year militancy witnessed by the state. Now 
after that in the valley those will be a re-beginning in the relationship. After 
the war bilateral talk has become inevitable, both countries have to change 
their attitude and should be very serious in there negotiation for peaceful 
solution. 
-,-,-, NON-VIOLENT SOLUTION 
103. PURI (Balraj). Hauge appeal on Kashmir. A step towards peace. Human 
Rights. 67-68; 1999, May-June; 1-5. 
A newly formed USA based council for an independent Kashmir had taken 
an initiative to organize a dialogue on non-violent solutions of the Kashmir 
issue. Such a process should continue on both sides of line of control, 
dialogue should be attempted between ethnic communities divided by the 
line of control. 
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-,-,-, NUCLEAR TEST, POKFTRAN 
104, BARDHAN (AB). Pokhran to Kargil. New Age. 47, 33; 1999, August, 15-
21; 1. 
The BJP government hastened to carry out the pokharan tests soon after it 
came to power forgetting the fact that it was by illuminating poverty and 
economic distress and strengthening economic might and social stability 
Pakistan followed suit within day by carrying out its own tests. The two 
countries thus sucked into a nuclear arms scenario at the cost of their real 
problems. 
-,-,-, NUCLEAR THREAT, NAVAL STAFF 
105. MEHTA (Ashok K). Silent war. Sunday. 26. 31; 1999, August, 7; 26. 
During the course of the Kargil Conflict, Pakistan had tried to blackmail 
India with the nuclear threat. India's Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sushil 
Kumar had responded that the Indian Navy was prepared to meet any threat 
including nuclear. The reference was to nuclear, biological, chemical 
defensive measures. The Kargil campaign was Atari service war. The 
nuclear profile of the Indian Navy will manifest once the Advanced 
Technology Vehicle project is folly restored. For the Pakistani Navy, the 
strategic warning at sea was clear: do not escalate, climb down Kargil. The 
navy enjoys extreme flexibility and versatility, the rulers of engagement 
have to be interpreted with great sensitivity and dispatch. 
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-,-,-, OBJECTIVE 
106. DESAI (Suresh). From Taraori to Kargil. Organizer. 50, 52; 1999, July, 25; 
2. 
Kargil was not a simple matter confined to the hills and glaciers of the 
region. It was one of the battles, though a very important one, in the war that 
was going on how for 800 years. There single minded objective was to 
subjugate rule entire India from tlinduksh to Rameshwar; Kargil was not 
possible to peep into the dark alleys and roadways of future and to 
prognosticate how manly such battles were in store for us. 
-,-,-, OPERATION RAKSHAK 
107. DINESH KUMAR. Kargil 99: A second himalyan blunder. Third World 
Impact. 60, 116; 1999, August, 1; 28-30. 
The biggest blunder was that the Indian Army had been involved in one of 
its most intensive and expensive counter-insurgency operation- Operation 
Rakshak in Kashmir. Due to 9 combination of factors that included effective 
line of control deployment, successfiil anti-militant operations and a 
warning of public support for acts of violence, the situation in the state had 
begun to vastly improve. The local Army formation failed to maintain the 
sanctity of line of control and detect intrusions until the enemy was well 
inside. 
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-,-,-,0PERAT10N VIJAY 
108. DEPANKH. Kargil - A fourth Battle? Third World Impact. 60, 115; 1999, 
July; 3-8. 
Pakistani intrusion in Kargil in the Kashmir has enhanced the chances of 
eruption of fourth war between India - Pakistan which had added to their 
arsenal nuclear weapons. The operation vijay in the Kargil sector has been 
facing adverse challenge due to rough terrain of the topography in the 
region. On the contrary Pakistan does not want to withdraw its army 
regulars because any such move would mean that Pakistan has accepted its 
defeat in the Kargil adventure. 
-,-,-, OPERATION VIJAY 
109. KAUL (Sumir). Indian Army surges ahead as Operation nears Vijay. 
Economic Times. 39, 111.1999, July, 12; 2. 
The Indian Army was poised for a decisive thrust in operation vijay with 
almost all enemy postions in Drass and Batalik sub-sectors. Indian Army 
grenadiers recaptured Rocky knobs in Mushkoh valley. Whether operations 
would be stopped following a meeting between directors. General of 
military operations of India and Pakistan. Bodies of Pakistani soldiers found 
from various position were being buried in accordance with military 
customs. 
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-,-,-,OPERATION VIJAY 
110. MENON (Sriprakash). Let us be like the Indian Soldier. Biltz on Sunday. 
59, 82; 1999, July, 25; 2. 
The 'Operation Vijay' at the kargil Sector of Jammu and Kashmir was an 
example of valour, duty, dedication and integrity of our soldiers. The 
civilian population or the public gets euphoric about such noble deeds, 
especially when it is none other than the Indian soldier who does it. The 
soldiers and Kargil should who does it. The soldiers and Kargil should now 
inspire us to be not just sympathisers and donors, but be patriots ourselves. 
-,-,-, OPERATION VIJAY 
111. S.ANDEED BAMZAI. Kargil fallout. Business India. 556: 1999, July, 11; 
35-38. 
The continuing border skirmishes have manifold implications and 
consequences: like tourism, economic media, government, stock market, 
diplomatic gains, military gains etc. After a decade of militancy, the valley 
of Kashmir was slowly but surely returning to normalcy. Operation vijay 
was launched by the Indian Army against the intruders, the most significant 
support for the Indians stand came fi-om the powerful group of Eight 
Industrial list countries. The army and air force have been able to evict the 
armed infiltrators from several points in the Kargil. 
-,-,-,OPERATION VIJAY, BSF 
112. NEW FRONT in the proxy war. Frontline. 15, 13; 1999, July, 3; 19-20. 
The Prankote Killings indicated the opening of a third front by militants, and 
the Indian security forces have accepted the challenge. According to the 
security forces, during this period militant groups were the ways with 
impunity. The crossing the border both operations were basically meant to 
be confidence-building measures and we have succeeded to a large extent in 
this respect. Many migrants have returned and the process was continuing. 
-,-,-,OPERATION VIJAY, LINE OF CONTROL 
113. OPERATION VIJAY: Situation in Kargil Yojana. 43, 8; 1999, August; 47-
50. 
The decision of Pakistan to cross the line of control, to send its men and 
materials to occupy our territory. For this reason Indian armed forces have 
launched a major operation to drive them back. Both sides further undertake 
to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line of 
control. 
-,-,-, ORIGIN 
114. AHMAD (Aijaz). Many roads to Kargil. Frontline. 16, 14; 1999, July, 16; 
18-25. 
The Kargil crisis has multiple sources and roots; failure to comprehend the 
transformation of the Pakistan state has proved costly, and pokhran was a 
gift to Sharif as the Afghan war for Zia. The two countries move toward 
nuclear weaporisation, the more Kargil we shall have. In this sense, the 
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present reality in Kargil is not only the other face of the rhetoric of Lahore, 
it is also a precise, necessary, repeatable consequence of Pokhran. 
-,-,-, ORIGIN, POKHRAN-II 
115. PRAVEEN SWAM. The Bungle in Kargil. People's Democracy. 23, 26; 
1999, June, 27; 10-13. 
The crisis in Kargil has its origin in the BJP led government's failure to 
comprehend the strategic consequences of Pokhran-II and its political 
blindness and failure to act on military intelligence. The shelling had broken 
out in Kargil as sporadic and the Indian Army was "well-prepared" to deal 
with the situation. India's war to region the Kargil heights had its origins not 
in simple military errors. 
-,-,-,PAK-US A RELATIONS, LINE OF CONTROL 
116. Singh (SK). Trust Post- Kargil. Third World Impact. 60, 116; 1999, August, 
1-9. 
Clinton -Nawaz Sharif joint statement had suggested that after the sanctity 
of the line of control was restored the process of bilateral dialogue 
envisaged in Lahore should be resumed. Clinton believes that Pakistan army 
regulars have been involved in the Kargil problem. The people of India were 
convince that Kargil was part of a deliberate charade, a deception. Indian 
people unwilling at present to be patient and tolerant with this fire some and 
dangerous. 
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-,-,-,POLICIES, APPROPRIATE 
117. KARGIL: The final Document, Janta. 54, 14; 1999, July, 18; 1-3. 
If Pakistan has come to grief sector, it was adventure in the Kargil sector, it 
was because it had miscalculated the situation within India as also in the 
world at large. If the armed forces begin to be restive because of these 
developments, then it would hamper the task of adopting appropriate 
pohcies. 
-,-,-, POLICY, CHINA 
118. SWARAN SINGH. China's Policy of neutrality in the Kargil conflict. Third 
World Impact. 60, 116; 1999, August, 1; 20-27. 
The world opinion seemed to be clearly one-sided; endorsing India's policy 
stance on the Kargil conflict. The most important question to explore 
answers was regarding the depth and longevity of this nutral thinking 
amongst the Chinese power elite. China's policy on Kargil was Kashmir as a 
historical issue involving territorial, ethic and religions elements which 
require to be solved only through peaceful means and the initiative for this 
were expected to come from Islamabad and New Delhi. 
-,-,-,POLICY, POLITICAL LEADERS 
119. AJITH PILLAI and ZAFAR MERAJ. If this is not war. What is? Outlook. 
5, 21; 1999, June, 7; 22. 
An undeclard war between India and Pakistan was being waged in the upper 
reaces of the Kargil -Dras sector of Jammu and Kashmir, "if this is not war 
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then what is? Asks a senior army officer, he repHed that this is serious stuff. 
No militant group can sustain this kind of intensity. The enemy is right up 
there we are down here easy targets in fact Kargil had been the epi Centre of 
media reports on the border confrontation because it is the only town in the 
area. While the defence ministry has not spoken of declaring war, those in 
the field feel that this is no law intensity conflict. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ASPECT 
120. DEEPDCA BHAN. Eye of the Hurricane. Rashtriva Sahara. 7, 4; 1999, 
August; 72-79. 
The government claims that normalcy was returning. But, it takes only a 
grenade attack or a shoot-out to blast this myth. In a change of strategy, 
militants now keep low profile while carrying out their operations stealthily, 
and with deadly precision. Kargil has not brought any significant change. In 
the Kashmir valley the more things change the more they remain the same. 
KARGIL CONFLICT, INDIA, PAKISTAN, POLITICAL INTERFERE 
12L MANOHAR (MS). Himalyan political blunders. Indian Currents. 11, 23; 
1999, June, 7-13; 17-19. 
The alleged intelligence failure symptomatic of the political and 
administrative inefficiency. It cannot be considered to be an incapability of 
our forces which have proved its Mattel many a time beyond doubt. Hence, 
the so-called large scale infiltration was an unrealistic story created by 
interested political manipulators as a pretext to cook up a war like situation 
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for a narrow political and or it was a sign not only of complete failure of our 
diplomacy but also of our ostrich like national prime. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
122. AFTER ARMED Conflict in Kargil. Monthly commentary. 40, 12; 1999, 
July, 5-6. 
Intruders from Pakistan were to start withdrawing under military and 
diplomatic pressure and the announcement of the schedule of general 
elections of the Lok Sabha. Controversies on the conduct of military 
operations in Kargil have neither substance nor validity and must be raised 
as election issues. There was much satisfaction and celebration over the 
military powers of India in Kargil, India must not lose sight of the threat of 
intervention by the USA. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
123. CROSSROADS IN Kargil. Frontier. 31, 51; 1999, July, 18-24; 1-2. 
Kargil war was over, no doubt Kargil head was subsiding but Kargil 
euphoria was likely to continue because all political parties, left and right 
alike, look dangerously ultra nationalist to cash in on it. The after month of 
the Kargil conflict cannot by any thing but painfijl for more than one reason, 
particularly in an election fear. So the hawks on both sides of the line of 
control matter while the so called doves find it useful to dribble in the 
midfield without seeking a new way to counter the harrors of the intruders. 
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-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
124. GOKHALE (Nitin A). Muddier by the day. Outlook. 5, 31, 1999, August, 
16; 24-25. 
The tnith about Kargil becomes a casualty as the army pulls out all stops vtv 
an increasingly murky cover-up. The warnings sent by Surinder Singh came 
through officials channels and are recorded and logged at every step. The 
top brass at army head quarters knows this and the MOD was aware of it. 
Kargil was designed not only to protect the army top brass but also the 
defence minister and the Vajpayee government, which hopes to reap a rich 
harvest of votes from the Kargil victory. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
125. KALRA (CS). Kargil: A tragedy yesterday. Political Currency Today. 
Universitv Todav. 19, 15; 1999, August, 1; 8. 
Kargil has become a testing ground for the un-initiated, of the media hocks. 
War. In best of times, is a dwarfed reaction of a civil society, it matters little 
it in the process the whole country, down to the smallest child, is kargilised 
and converted into a war machine. A thoroughly bungled operation and a 
monumental intelligence and command failure is being presented to the 
nation as a victory. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
126. KOTTOR (James). Kargil and eye opener a blessing in desguise. Indian 
currents. 11, 23; 1999, June, 7-13; 20-22. 
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What was happening to our country during the last 50 years? Was it not a 
more gruesome story of traitors and looters from within the country, a story 
of the most unccrupulons politician and unpatriotic criminal elements. 
Jointly or separately robbing the nation by the crores and stacking them in 
Swiss or other banks in flourishing world capitals? 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
127. KREPON (Michael). Kargil challenge. The Hindu. 122, 183; 1999, August, 
3; 11. 
The Kargil misadventure could mark a new phase of political incoherence in 
Pakistan, in which even a prime minister, who has systematically 
diminished alternative power centers and who wilds vast controls over 
parliamentary manoeuvre, cannot maintain a systematic , constructive policy 
line towards India. The Kargil operation could represent a significant 
turning point if India's major political parties can at last agree to support 
new initiatives towards resdution of the Kashmir dispute. The Kargil 
operation would constitute a major watershed if domestic political 
manoeuvers could subside sufficiently for the next government to move the 
Kashmir issue. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
128. MALHOTRA (Inder). Handle with care. Sundav. 26, 30; 1999, July, 31; 11. 
Vajpayee. Government has decided to appoint a commission to inquire into 
the manifest failure of intelligence. Prime minister was in declaring at one 
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stage that there had been no failure of intelligence in Kargil because nothing 
had happened in that sector for 22 year. During the fierce fighting in Kargil, 
the armed forces had reasons to be unhappy with the way politicians on both 
sides of the fence were handling the Kargil issue as an instrument of scoring 
debating points against each other. It would be a grim tragedy if the armed 
forces get caught in the crossfire of political warfare. One expects better 
from the leaders of the world's largest democracy, but when electoral 
exigencies beckon, everything can go wrong. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
-,-,-,POLrnCAL ISSUE 
129. NEERAJ KUMAR. Kargil: Before and After. Organiser.5 L 4; 1999, 
August, 22; 9. 
There was an urgent need to carry out a detailed geo-political and geo-
military analysis of the entire border, including that with China keeping in 
mind the political objective of Pakistan, so that the future government and the 
military leadership was not outsmarted by it hereafter. 
130. NOORANI (AG). Kargil diplomacy. Frontline. 16, 16; 1999, August, 13; 
100. 
The government granted safe passage to the intruders, made a secret deal 
with Pakistan with whom it parleyed even while the intrusion was on and 
agreed to a cease fire. It did all this in breach of claims it made foolishly 
and unnecessarily. Every country of significance pronounced on the crisis. 
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Bharatiya Janta Party led government that, although it bought about an end 
to Pakistan's reckless adventure along the northern segment of the line of 
control. Its record on the diplomatic front is highly suspect. Pakistan had 
succeeded in reinforcing its positions. Its forces were demoralized; but much 
bloodshed was averted and would have been averted if the government had 
not politicized Kargil. The government could have stuck to its offer, a sound 
one though unwisely proclaimed in public. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE 
131. PURI (Balraj). Real Estate. Combat. 6, 51; 1999, July; 9-10. 
All debate on Kargil that dominates the national agenda is based on the 
presumption that the entire conflict between India and Pakistan over jammu 
and K^hmir is based on the title over real estate. In other words, it means a 
refusal to accept the vital fact that people of the state also matter. India's 
decisive victory would depend on how far it can meet the political fall-out of 
Kargil. Can it help Kargil to feel a secure and proud part of a secular ladakhi 
identity, which requires restoration of traditional friendly and cordial 
relations between Buddhists and Muslims? 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE, IMPACT, VAJPAYEE (Atal Bihari) 
132. CHAWALA (Vijay) and VERMA (Sudesh K). Vajpayee makes Kargil main 
poll plank. Business Standard. 25, 14; 1999, August, 19; 2. 
Kargil appears to have become the central focus of Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee's campaign for the 13*'' lok sabha elections. Author said 
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that Kargil was in Lahore and the Prime Minister had achieved a miHtary 
victory there, Kargil was a hill somewhere along the border region. 
Audience were unaware of what had exactly happened in Kargil. The 
situation in Kargil and the way the Jawans fought to drive out the 
infiltrators. 
~,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE, PEOPLE'S INTEREST 
133. RAJESH JOSHI. Kargil's Own Little War. Outlook. 5, 34; 1999, 
September, 6; 28-3 L 
The Kargil conflagration may be an election issue for the rest of India, but, 
surprisingly, none in the war zone itself seems interested. Candidates from 
Kargil and Leh spell out programmes aimed at their region, not the whole of 
Ladakh. Srinagar and Leh via Kargil, shells from across the border landed 
only a few yards away from our car, clearly, for the local populace, the 
current elections are a distant affair and personal safety was right up there 
on their priority. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE, RAJYA SABHA SESSION, CONTINUE 
134. DASGUPTA (Gurudas). Kargil test: will India win battle for Democracy. 
New Age. 47, 27; 1999, July, 4-10; 9. 
Voices have not been raised over the fact that no special session of the 
Rajya Sabha, the Permanent house of legislature, has been called even when 
the country faces a war like situation is surprising. Some congress leaders 
have feebly floated the idea without the party officially taking a position 
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while others in the opposition have refrained from even raising the issue, 
being conspicuous in their silence. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister, Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee, has shot down the suggestion for an extra ordinary session 
of the Rajya Sabha because the caretaker government would like to cover up 
the massive intelligence failure on the prolonged build up by Infiltrators 
within Indian territory. 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE, NAWAZ SHARIF. 
135. ENGINEER (Asghar Ali). Kargil and Indo-Pak relations. Nation and the 
World. 8, 186; 1999, July, 16; 18. 
Nawaz Sharif had won the last election on the promise that he will improve 
relations with India, for variety of reasons there is great derive among the 
people of Pakistan for better relationship with India, different sections of 
people have different reasons for that. Traders and Industrialists have their 
own compulsions and they want increased volume of trade between two 
countries. Thus the army was waiting for an opportunity to strike against 
India and it chose the Kargil area to do so. It is true that the army in Pakistan 
would hardly rejoice when relations between the two countries improve. But 
that does not mean that the army can undertake such a major infiltration 
derive in Kargil without the knowledge, let alone approval, of Nawaz Sharif 
-,-,-,POLITICAL ISSUE, VAJPAYEE'S VIEW 
136. NAYAR (Kuldip). The Kargil Fallout. Radiance. 34, 27; 1999, July, 25-31; 
8-9. 
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The Kargil fighting was confined to one part of the line of control. Both 
India and Pakistan will feel tremors for a long time to come. Vajpayee's 
warning that Kargil should not be politicized has been of no avail. The 
humiliation of Pakistani forces can lead to two things: One the army will be 
cut to size, two , the army can lick. Its wounds till such time as it gets an 
opportunity to have its revenge on the rulers. 
-,-,-, POLITICAL STRATEGY, LOC. 
137. RANDHAWA (K.S.). Pakistan's two track Strategy. Politics India. 4, 1; 
1999, July; 7-8. 
A sagging economy, mounting charges of corruption and the need to keep 
the Pakistani Army reassured o their position, required a new strategy. This 
was an ideal strategy, by doing a "Siachen" to India and cutting off the line 
of control to Ladakh. Obviously the advisers thought it would be fait 
accompanied did not except India to be able to undo it soon. By then, 
Pakistan felt that internationalization of the issue would have been achieved. 
This was one game plan which seems to have gone away for Pakistan. 
-,-,-,PRO-INDIA, TILT, US 
138. VERMA (Kewal). Kargil could be a tumign point. Business Standard. 24, 
357; 1999, July, 23; 7. 
Kargil could be a turning point in India's history. For the first time since 
Independence, the US has shown a pro-India tilt. What has led to this 
change of heart? There seems to be mainly two main factors. One that the 
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u s is fed up with Muslim fundamentalism. Two Pakistan cannot detach 
itself from Muslim fundamentalism. Pakistan, because of its history, finds it 
comfortable to identify with Muslim fundamentalism. For over 50 years we 
have had a mindset of opposing whatever the US does. 
-,-,-, PROTEST, INDIAN COMMUNITY, SAN-FRANCISCO 
139. GHOSH (Ajay), NRI's perception on post Kargil India. Indian Currents. 11, 
33; 1999, August, 16-22; 15-17. 
Kargil brought the Indian community here closer than anything else in 
recent times did. In an unprecedented show of solidarity, over 2000 Indians 
formed a human chain on the Golden Gate Bridge, san Francisco, to protest 
against Pakistani's aggression there were our weapons. Our right to vote 
was our rifle and uniform. We were the soldier of democracy, if our brave 
soldiers could brave certain death, ice and deadly heights for us 
-,-,-, RAPt^ASHABHA, ROLE, GOVERNMENT 
140. SURENDRA MOHAN. Kargil Stalemate: why government is Afraid to 
Rajya Sabha Debate? Radiance. 34, 26; 1999, July, 18-24; 10-11. 
There was officers in the armed forces and the BSF who have said that the 
government had been warned of what was happening in that area, in April 
itself Strange as it might seem, the ministry says that its source of 
information was some reports from the local shepherds. The operations 
started on April 8, and the nation was taken into confidence four days later. 
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Is it that the government is afraid of facing such questions in Rajya Sabha? 
But, these facts are now common Knowledge. 
-,-,-,REACTION 
141. HARKISHAN SINGH SURGEET. Aftermath of kargil: Extra caution 
needed to avoid traps. People's Democracy. 23, 29; 1999, July, 18; 1-3. 
In this article writer tried to put forth to the Pakistani people that war was 
dangerous both for Pakistan and India warned that "no independence 
movement in the world had ever been quelled through use of military force. 
Nawaz Sharif tried to argue that the very purpose of the Kargil intrusion has 
been served. There were some crucial facts hidden behind Kargil. Firstly, 
Pakistan has been consistently encouraging terrorist activities in Kashmir. 
Secondly, by committing to withdrawal etc. 
-,-,-, RECAPTURE, OCCUPIED TERRITORY 
142. RAJA (D) "After me the Deluge" says Vajpayee. New Age. 47, 28; 1999, 
July, 11-17; 1. 
Army was fighting a heroic battle to recapture our own territory occupied by 
the intruders in Kargil. It has been paying tremendous price by shedding 
blood and laying down precious lives of our officers and soldiers not only to 
defend the borders in the extremely difficult mountainous terrain's and 
adverse climate of the Kargil region but Also for the failures and inept 
handling of the situation by the BJP led caretaker government 
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-,-,-, RELATION 
143, SRINIVAS LAXMAN. Kargil does not hit India, Pak air trafic. The Times 
oflndia. 162, 168; 1999, July, 15; 11. 
Air travel between India and Pakistan remained unaffected during the Kargil 
crisis. Indian and Pakistani soldiers exchanged fire in Kargil and adjoining 
areas, many people in Mumbai and Karachi made a beeline to travel agents 
and airline offices to make bookings to fly to both these destinations a large 
percentage who traveled from Pakistan to India came to seltheir relative and 
fi-iends the Indian Airlines office at Karanchi was targeted by miscreants 
some years ago along some other Indian government establishments. After 
the outbreak of the Kargil crisis to immediately alert the local police if the 
situation warranted. 
-,-,-, RELATION, INDO-US 
144. TARUN BASU. Kargil handling masterful; US. The Pioneer. 9, 204; 1999, 
July, 26; 1. 
India and the united states look set to enter what officials from both sides 
were calling a qualitatively new relationship in the post Kargil era after an 
hour long meeting between external affairs minister Jaswant Singh and 
secretary of state Madeleine Albright. 
-,-,-, RELATIONSHIP, LOVE HATE 
145. MALIKANI (KR). The fall out of the Bus Ride to Lahore. Muslim India. 
17, 198; 1999, June; 284. 
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Pakistan had signed a military alliance with the united states in the hopes of 
measuring swards with India on equal terms. Even now no speech at any 
indo-Pakistan forum is complete without a reference to Kashmir. They 
describe it as the core issue. India Pakistan have had a love hate 
relationship. The BJP government was well placed to find a solution to the 
long-pending problems between the two countries. 
-,-,-, RELATIONSHIP, MILITARY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY, 
PAKISTAN 
146. BHARAT BHUSHAN. Dispite Kargil, no fear of Army coup. The 
Hindustan Times. 75, 195, July, 18; 1. 
The Kargil would not change the relationship between the military and the 
political authority in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis however, believe that there is 
no fear of a military coup in the aftermath of Kargil. The Kargil episode was 
bound to have created some heartburn and disappointment in the army, 
particularly among the junior officers, there is also a feeling that there is no 
chance of an imminent conflict between the civilian authority and the 
military could the Kargil debacle, therefore, mean that the present leadership 
of the Pakistan Army does not have a strategic vision but only a tactical 
one? Today the discussion on these issues is an activist one. People are 
asking the right question. Out of this, a strategic vision can develop. It is for 
the political leadership then to sketch it out and seek a national consensus on 
it. 
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-,-,-,RESOLUTION 
147. PEASANT (B). Assembly Adopts all-party Resolution on Kargil. People's 
Democracy. 23, 25; 1999, June, 20; 16. 
Pakistan's heinous deed of crossing the line of control and trying to 
encroach on Indian territory. An all party resolution was also adopted to this 
effect , some media person asked about the possibility of elections getting 
postponed because of the Kargil affairs. 
-,-,-,ROLE, AIR AND NAVY FORCE 
148. RAJONDER BAWEJA. Slow but steady. India Today. 24, 26; 1999, June, 
28; 34. 
The mountains in Kargil started reyerberating with the sound of gunfire. 
Unlike India, which is aware of a measured approach, Pakistan has not only 
openly admitted to its troops, involvement in the Kargil battle but is even 
being bold enough to violate Indian air space. Indian troops are now 
advancing towards the highest feature at the height of 5, 140 m on tololing 
and towards the near by Tiger hill. Heightened air and artillery activity saw 
the navy and the air force go on full alert. Pakistan has made deployments 
on tactical locations. They are preparing for action and it is imperative for 
the Indian Navy to prepare itself to prevent any surprises at sea. The moving 
In of artilleiy and armored brigades by Pakistan along the line of control, 
while aimed at engaging India in more than just the Kargil sector. 
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-,-,-,ROLE, ARMED FORCES 
149. KARATPRAKASH. Kargil and beyond: BJP's strategic outlook exploded. 
People's Democracy. 23, 26; 1999, June, 27; 1-3-15. 
Indian armed forces were working in extremely difficult conditions to 
dislodge the entrenched Pakistani soldiers and armed intruders in 
mountainous terrain and icy climatic conditions. Vajpayee's government 
have the dangerous potential of internationalizing the Kashmir issue. In this 
article author highlights some important issues like, the US agenda, correct 
approach, fallacy called balance of terror, dangerous potential B JP groping 
for a new posture, recipe of Disaster. 
-,-,-,ROLE, ARMY 
150. DINESH KUMAR. Kargil to be manned all the time. The Times of India. 
162, 167; 1999, July, 14; 1. 
The army was working out a strategy on how to prevent recurrence of a 
Pakistan intrusion in to prevent recurrence of a Pakistan intrusion in the 
Kargil sector. The strategy was being worked out and plans are being 
formulated. An additional division is likely to be deployed in this sector. 
This could mark the siachenisation of the Kargil area, although the Pakistani 
soldiers were seen to be vacating their positions. Army officials said that 
they were trying to simultaneously verify their withdrawal our soldiers are 
on high alert and they will remain so till the entire area is vacated. Pakistani 
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Army which is still up to two km away from the line of control. Army 
would not shoot at retreating Pakistani soldiers. 
-,-,-,ROLE OF ARMY 
151. RAJ CHENGAPPA. Holding the heights. India Today. 24, 33; 1999, 
* 
August, 16; 46. 
The Kargil mountains the Indian troops guarding the peaks call it a "No 
war, no peace situation" the Indian army gears up to defend 150 km of the 
world's most inhospitable battlefield under intensely bitter winter 
condition. Holding siachen is a lot more easier. The force required in Kargil 
will be twice as much probably more. They understand only force and there 
were need for more lethal weapons to deter them. Kargil war showed up 
apart from the total intelligence failure that led to the intrusions remaining 
undetected till the Pakistanis were deeply entrenched. Another failure had 
been India's inability to silence Pakistan's artillery guns. 
-,-,-,ROLE, BJP 
152. CHATTERJEE (PK). Lessons of Kargil war we must never forget. 
Mainstream 37, 37; 1999, September, 4; 6-24. 
Kargil war was said to be over and our BJP leaders are gloating over a 
supposed victory, both military and diplomatic Kargil may not be the last of 
such incidents. The friendly overtures by Gujral and the bus diplomacy of 
Atal Bihari may have been justified if they had resorted to them with the 
knowledge of the Kargil incursions. 
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-,-,-, ROLE, B P 
153. NAYER (Kuldeep). Kargil conflict: The political fallout. Third World 
Impact. 60, 116; 1999, August, 1; 10-11. 
Kargil's biggest fallout was in the political field the main advantage of 
Kargil looks like going to the Bhartiya Janta Party, Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
has become taller in stature. It was difficult to assess the impact on the 
future relations, their limited contacts and still more limited efforts towards 
normalcy. The atmosphere created in the wake of the meeting between 
Vajpayee and Sharif at Lahore in February will not return for a long time to 
come. 
-,-,-,ROLE, BJP 
154. PRAVEEN SWAMI. BJP's Own Goal. Frontline. 15, 13; 1999, July, 3; 4-
8. 
The strategic fallout from Pokhran, and the BJP's provocative attempt to 
link India's new 'nuclear weapon' status with the Kashmir dispute have 
turned out to be self defeating. These have resulted in the 
internationalization of the Kashmir issue, which India has resisted all along. 
The BJP led coalition govt, was at least, if not more, devoid of ideas on 
engaging with violence in the state. 
-,-,-, ROLE, BJP GOVERNMENT 
155. SANTOSH TIWARY. BJP Creating intellectual terror on Kargil issue: 
RajeshPiolt. Financial Express. 25, 116; 1999, August, 10; 9. 
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Bharatiya Janta Party was trying to take political advantage of the good 
work done by the armed forces in Kargil. BJP had created an intellectual 
terror in the country. The intruders in Kargil should have been thrown back 
or killed. BJP led government has left behind a trail of failures on every 
front. Rajesh said that we are looking on up to what extent, we can 
overcome the dent, they will make. 
-,-,-, ROLE, BJP GOVERNMENT 
156. SUKHWINDER MALHI. BJP government kept nation in dark over kargil: 
CWC. National Herald. 31. 134; 1999, July, 23; 1. 
Congress working committee (cwc) session concluding its deliberations 
over Pakistan - sponsored intrusion in Kargil and host of other poll related 
issues. Our brave armed forces who have driven out the intruders from our 
territory in the Kargil sector but the govt, kept the nation in the dark on 
Kargil though it was fully aware of intrusions. 
-,-,-, ROLE, BSF 
157. JOSHI (Manoj) and RAJ CHENGAPPA. Marathon war. India Todav. 24, 
25; 1999, June, 21; 21-26. 
Pakistan's determination to prolong its Kargil offensive and escalate the 
war on India's Kashmir borders and focus international attention on the 
dispute. India's armed forces were coming to terms with the difficulty of 
the task. The army's first attacks was to clear the intruders from the vital 
tololing and tiger hill heights. As the force close in the brass was rapidly 
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revising it estimates of just how long the battle over Kargil will continue. 
There can be no scope for miscalculations or letting the war spin out of 
control. 
-,-,-, ROLE, CONGRESS 
158. IYER (Lakshmi). Kargil leaves cong in a bind. The Pioneer . 9, 196; 1999, 
July, 18; 1. 
The congress leadership decided to keep its step in tune with the mood of 
the nation as bounced by the media. Spokespersons chose to focus on a 
Kargil cess that the govt, denied that it had ever even considered 
imposing. The congress effort must be to shift the focus ft-om Kargil to the 
business of stability and governance. 
-,-,-,ROLE, CONGRESS-BJP 
159. BATURA (RC). Kargil crowns Vajpayee: Congress in jitters. Organiser. 
51, 1; 1999, August, 1; 3. 
Where the congress was deliberately trying to confiise the people was that 
artillery fire from across the line of control and armed intrusion for the 
purpose of capturing territory were two altogether different situations. 
Kargil would prove very costly for the BJP led alliance in the September 
poll and that it might pave the way for the congress to return to power at the 
centre. 
160. NAYAR (Kuldip). Cover-up Job. Radiance. 34, 28; 1999, August, 1-7; 51-
52. 
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One positive thing was that the government was in favour of appointing a 
commission of inquiry to pinpoint the responsibility for three things: On, 
unpreparedness, two negligence, and three, intelligence failure. The probe 
was important, not only to punish the quilty but also to plug the loopholes. 
One did not want to apportion blame in the thick of war; Both sides were 
boastful. 
-,-,-,ROLE, GOVERNMENT. 
161. QURESHI (Ahtesham). Probing Kargil. The Pioneer. 9, 206; 1999, July, 
28; 9. 
There was no Lok Sabha at present, and the government has been taking 
all major decision inspite of having lost the vote of confidence on the floor 
of the house. The government must be accountable to parliament, and 
through it to the people at large, to explain the failures and the persons 
responsible for such costly failures. But the B P led govt, has all along 
evaded such an accountability. 
-,-,-,ROLE, GOVERNMENT, INDIA AND USA 
162. FLARE-UP IN Kargil. Public Opinion. 154, 9; 1999, June; 3-4. 
The response of the government in India to the flare-up in Kargil deserves 
to be unreservedly commended and supported. The position in Kargil was 
grim. A long drawn to military - political-diplomatic campaign was ahead 
of India. The USA may have taken a stand on the Kargil conflict which was 
seemingly favorable to India. Between India and Pakistan at any level of 
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their accreditated representations before the intruders across the line of 
control in Kargil. 
-,-,-,ROLE, GOVERNMENT AND ARMY 
163. GOKHALE (Nitin A) and PILLAI (Ajith). War that should never have 
been. Outlook. 5, 34; 1999, September, 6; 21-7. 
In this article the author discussed that a set of documented facts brings to 
light the truth about Kargil. Behind the much-feted victory in Kargil lurks a 
colossal blunder. A bungle which involves the top hierarchy of the 
government as well as the army. In a gist, had the political and army 
leadership simply been more alert and alive to the situation, Kargil need not 
have happened at all. 
-,-,-,ROLE, INDIAN AIRFORCE 
164. MASHEEH RAHMAN. Can't stop the Madness. lime. 154, 7/8; 1999, 
August, 23; 18-19. 
The hostilities between India and Pakistan should break out in the most in 
hospitable of settings. Indian airforce jet shot down a Pakistan Navy 
reconnaissance aircraft, killed the five officers and 11 ment on board. 
Pakistan said the French-made atlantique, a long range twin engine 
turboprop aircraft designed for electronic snooping. The aircraft was 
unarmed, and it had not violated Indian air space. Not unlike the barren 
ridges of Kargil, the badlands of the rann are suddenly bristling with 
weaponry and soldiers 
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-,-,-,ROLE, JAWANS . 
165. EVER MORE dangerous in Kashmir. The Economist. 351, 8124; 1999, 
June, 19; 27-28. 
India was the likelier instigator. It was claiming slow but steady progress in 
its campaign to evict several hundred Pakistan backed intruders from its 
side of the line of control in Kashmir. The Indian Jawnas were attempting 
to fight while scaling peaks in which the intruders occupy nearly 
impregnable positions. Two countries may mistake the other's defensive 
build up as preparation for aggression and take pre-emptive action against 
it. Pakistanis suggest that the tapes are forgeries, if not, peace may depend 
on politicians crossing the line of control separating them from the 
generals. 
-,-,-,ROLE, JAWANS 
166. MENON (Ramesh). Blood, Guts, and Glory. Rashtriva Sahara. 7, 4; 1999, 
August; 24-46. 
Jawans says if they had their way, they would have walked across the line 
of control and pitched the Indian tricolour deep into Pakistan. In many 
places, Pakistani intruders just pushed huge rocks down the mountains to 
kill Indian Jawans who were climbing the steep slopes. 
-,-,-,ROLE, MEDIA 
167. BHAGAT (Rasheeda). Pak livid at Indian media jingoism. Business Line. 
1999, August, 22; 4. 
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The people in Pakistan were stunned at the kind of Jingoism and Mass 
hysteria the Indian media can whip up when it comes to stirring up 
nationalist fervour. Pakistan's media exercise falling for short of India's 
when it came to conveying the country's view point on the Kargil conflict 
to the international audience. If Kargil became a war, the Indian media was 
responsible to a large extent. The Indian media reporting on the Kargil-
Dras-Batalik conflict. 
-,-,-,ROLE, MEDIA 
168. KISHORE KUMAR. Kargil: A media war. Third World Impact. 60, 116; 
1999, August, 1; 24-7. 
It was well known that all the organizations involved in the Kargil intrusion 
were members of the International Islamic front of Jehad against the US 
and Israel. Imagine the people enjoying world cup cricket and Kargil war 
alternatively with the touch of a button on remote controls. The technology 
of communications and broad casting had come a long way, but the 
contents were still mired in old prejudices and warped mindset. A TV 
journalist summed up the situation thus: I would not like to carry a story 
that might hurt the army's moral. 
-,-,-,ROLE, MILTANTS 
169. CLIFTON (Tony). Kashmir: militants on the March. News week. 134, 8; 
1999, August, 23 ;41. 
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India downs a Pakistani Navy Plane as new rebel attacks ratchet up tension 
in the troubled territory. The guns of war had just fallen silent over Kargil, 
high in the mountains of Kashmir. The border town of Kargil fell quiet 
following the withdrawal of regular Pakistani troops. Especially when 
cross-border shelling was going on, when men were being killed almost 
everyday in Kashmir and there was a major armed confrontation. The 
situation was not spiraling out of control. 
-,-,-,ROLE, MILITANTS 
170. YUSUF JAMEEL. J & K Militants kill-7 Jawans on 1-day eve. Blitz on 
Sunday. 54, 85; 1999, August, 15; 1-29. 
In Jammu and Kashmir seven soldiers were killed and nine others injured 
when suspected militants attacked an army camp. Kashmiri secessionists 
have once again announced a boycott of Independence Day celebration. 
They will try to organize anti-India shows on the occasion. The security 
forces were more vigilant. This has raised the death toll among the troops to 
25 in such attacks carried out in the twin districts. 
-, •,-,ROLE, MUJAHIDEEN 
171. RAJ CHENGAPPA. Advantage India. India Today. 24, 24; 1999, June, 14; 
35. 
India may have been slow to wake up to Pakistan's gambit in Kargil. In the 
diplomatic battle in succeeded in quickly neutralizing the gains its hostile 
neighbour. Pakistan maintained that the war in Kargil was being conducted 
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by the mujahideen and not by its Army. It is more of a propaganda rather 
than a sincere effort for lasting peace. Pakistan has snot really made too 
much headway in its efforts to internationalize the issue. Pakistan's main 
objectives for pushing for a limited war in Kargil have not been achieved. 
Diplomatically, Sharif is on the defensive. Militarily, Pakistan did not 
really expect India's tough response and has been forced to rethink its 
strategy at Kargil. The weight of international opinion tips the balance in 
favour of India in the diplomatic battle. 
-,-,-,ROLE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
172. PRASANNAN (R). Plane Truths. The Week. 17, 36; 1999, August, 22; 32-
39. 
The downing of the enemy plane comes after a series of intelligence 
assessment failures and inter service and inter ministerial tussles. There was 
a larger political strategic motive of bringing a third party into the India 
Pakistan stand-off. The national security council which was intended to 
provide the government with a holistic view on security and found Kargil 
on its lap, the bureaucratic swamps seem to be swallowing every security 
proposal. 
-,-,-,ROLE, NAWAZ SHARIF 
173. SINHA (Anup Kumar). Best out of the Kargil bargain. Third World Impact. 
51, 3; 1999, August, 15; 47. 
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One should not be surprised at the thawing of relations between the two 
great democracies of the world in the post-Kargil. The psot-Pokhran era has 
only aggravated the situation. Nawaz sharif in his bid to strike a balance 
between the democratic imperatives to save Pakistan and the demands of 
Islamic fundamentalists breathing down his neck, has proved to be, at best, 
a reluctant prime minister,' 
-,-,-,ROLE, PEOPLE 
174. PURI (Balraj). India's Kargil Policy: Serious Flaws, Economic and 
Political weekly. 34, 28; 1999, July, 10; 1867. 
The policy on Kashmir needs a through review. No policy can afford to 
ignore the role of the people and their genuine aspirations in Jammu and 
Kashmir which implies recognition of all ethnic identities including the 
Shina speaking community of Drass and a reconciliation of the diverse 
needs. These internal and external developments had been taken notice of 
and action co-ordination among the different wings of the government. The 
eloquent hints about activities of Pak intruders in Kargil would not have 
been dismissed so summarily either by intelligence agencies or the defence 
forces or the government. 
-,-,-,ROLE, POLITICAL PARTIES 
175. BEYOND KARGIL. Frontier, 31, 49; 1999, July, 4-10; 1-2. 
Strangely, objectivity was in short supply in the last two months of the 
Kargil conflict. They have been recapturing the recaptured, heights in 
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Batalic for several weeks, only to expose their limitations. All political 
parties look too eager to cash in on the Kargil imbroglio without bothering 
about the fall out of the prolongation of the conflict. 
-,-,-,ROLE, POLITICAL PARTIES 
176. BOBB (Dilip). Kargil Effect. India Today. 24, 32; 1999, August, 9; 49. 
Like the Raman effect and similar discoveries of Himalayan proportion we 
are now witnessing the ubiquitous Kargil effect. In effect is that all those 
who participated in the war effort via remote control are now making their 
guilt more complex by creating new and innovative ways of honouring our 
brave soldiers. Here are some examples of coming events. The congress, 
desperate to regain lost territory is in hot pursuit of ways and means to open 
up various front to avoid slipping back. 
-,-,-,ROLE, PRISONERS 
177. VENKATESH (K). Gang Way for Kargil. BHtz. 59, 79; 1999, July, 4; 13. 
Francis Coutinho, a senior chhota Rajan gang member, wants to be sent to 
the battle front in Kargil to defend his country. Their decisions have been 
influenced by guilt for their crimes. These prisoners have been inspired by 
reports in the media about war in Kargil. Two other inmates of the central 
jail want to be in n the action at Kargil. coutinho at home with all manner 
of weapons including the AK-47 assault rifle is serving time in the central 
jail for attempt to murder. 
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-,-,-,ROLE, SAUDI ARABIA 
178. JAY ARAM (P). Jaswant praises Saudi role in Kargil crisis. Economic 
Times. 39, 146; 1999, August, 21; 2. 
Jaswant Singh had praised the role played by Saudi Arabia in defusing the 
Kargil conflict with Pakistan. Pakistan described as Kashmiri freedom 
fighters but India said were Pakistani army regulars, who had intruded into 
Kargil from across the line control. Pakistan's intense efforts to get India 
condemned for the Kargil conflict, it was significantly toned down version 
that was finally issued, largely due to the influential role of the Saudis. 
-,-,-,ROI£, TELEVISION 
179. PRASAD (HY Sharda) Cricket on TV in the time of Kargil. Politics India. 
4 ,1 ; 1999, July; 11-12. 
It was true that bad programmes drive out the good. But it certainly does 
not happen all the time. It was not as if the people will turn their faces away 
from good programmes if they were given to them. A telling example was 
the appeal that the National geographic and discovery programmes have for 
children. Until now, like love in the time of cholera, it has been cricket in 
the time of Kargil. 
-,-,-,ROLE, VAJPAYEE (Atal Bihari) 
180. DHAR (MK). India's Diplomatic Initiatives Pay off. Employment News. 
24, 15; 1999, July, 10-16; 1-2. 
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A redeeming feature of the on going conflict in Kargil. Mr. Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee, himself took the initiative to inform world leaders about 
Pakistan's naked aggression in Kashmir. If, Pakistan had hoped to 
internationalize the Kashmir issue through its military misadventure. 
Owing to its misadventure, Pakistan had also lost its clout with the Islamic 
world. Mr. Nawaz Sharif will not end Pakistan's isolation. The only way in 
which it can extricate itself from the situation was by withdrawing the 
mercenaries and troops and ending the aggression against India, 
-,-,-,ROLE, VAJAPAYEE (Atal Bihari) 
181. KARAT PRAKASH. Kargil and beyond. Frontline. 16, 14; 1999, July, 16; 
15-17. 
The strategic perception of the Vajpayee govt, that the nuclear tests had 
made India a great power and the Lahore visit was a peace dividend from 
this policy was at the root of its complacency, which led to the Kargil 
fiiasco, if India persists in petitioning the G-8 on Kargil it will e difficult tot 
prevent the Kashmir issue being taken up by the UN Security council in the 
future. 
-,-,-,ROLE, VAJPAYEE (Atal Bihari) 
182. SHAMEEM FAIZEE. Kargil Noose Tightnens on Vajpayee, Advani, 
Fernandes and Mishra. New Age. 47, 36; 1999, September, 5-11; 1-2. 
With the publication of correspondence between the then military 
commander in Kargil and the army head quarters, it was quite obvious that 
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the Vajpayee regime has not only shown criminal negligence in the matter 
of national security but is still attempting to whitewash the whole episode. 
If probed properly many in the top echelon including ministers have to face 
charges of sedition, 
-,-,-, SACRIFICE, BSF 
183. SHARMA (Dwarika Prasad) A Petulant reaction to Kargil retreat. The 
Times of India. 162, 169; 1999, July, 16; 10. 
The top ranking BSF officer of the headquarter, S.K. Chakravarty, his 
intelligence chief Mohan Raj, sub. Inspector clerk bhaskaran and the wife 
of a constable were killed, was apparently a petulant reaction of the 
militants to the morale demolishing retreat form Kargil charted by the 
political leadership of Pakistan, There are reports that the militant groups. 
Trying to regroup themselves in hope of a prolonged engagement of 
security forces along the borders. The morale of the militants shad received 
a drubbing in the context of Kargil, and the mercenaries would resort to 
dramatic action to register their presence. 
-,-,-, SECULARISM 
184. RAJ ARAM (NS). Intelligence failure or Intellectual failure? Organiser. 51, 
1; 1999, August, 1;5. 
Kargil a military success has also exposed the object failure of secularist 
intellectuals and the reckless opportunism of some politicians. Indian 
intellectuals failed to recognize and analyze the ideological forces that were 
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driving Pakistan, and how under president Zia's Taliban ideology, Pakistan 
had become indistinguishable from talibanism. Intellectuals in India 
steeped in leftism and appeasement of Muslims were not prepared to face 
the truth about Islamic terror. 
-,-,-, SECURITY, NEED, MODERN EQUIPMENT 
185. KARGIL IN Retrospeect. Organiser. 51, 4; 1999, August, 22; 10. 
With loss of lives crossing 400 and navy more wounded, some even 
missing peace was at last restored at the Kargil Drass sectors in Jammu and 
Kashmir with the last of the intruders leaving the Indian soil. The 
discussion brought to light that despite the fact that we are vigilant and 
alert, there was utter and urgent need to purchase modern equipment and 
technology to assure security of the nation. 
-,-,-, SOLUTION 
186. KAMATH (MV) After Kargil, what ? Organiser. 50, 52; 1999, July, 25; 6. 
The Pakistan army can't complain that it has no control over the 
mujahideens. Mercenaries of bin Laden have to be asked to withdraw under 
threat of being shot if they disobey. In any agreement it must be laid down 
that any ISI activity against India in future would be considered an act of 
war and would free India from any constraints. A wise Pakistani leadership 
will make its peace with India, surrender the territory it now occupies in 
Kashmir back to India and learn to be India's junior partner in all matters, 
political, economic, social, military and economic. 
I l l 
-,-,-,SPEECHES, VAJPAYEE 
187. SEEMA MUSTAFA. The Politicisation of Kargil. Nation of the world. 8, 
190; 1999, September, 16; 39-41. 
Kargil has figured in almost every election speech made by Vajpayee. The 
opposition has made a half hearted effort to get into the act. The regional 
parties have issues other than Kargil to focus on the speeches are good 
mixture of Kargil as national achievement. So it has been left largely to the 
congress to take away from the BJP'S hour of glory and it has done an 
unusually bad job of it. 
-,-,-, STRATEGIC PLANNING 
188. MALVIKA SINGH. Crisis of Strategy. Business India. 555; 1999, July, 
14-27; 36. 
The Kargil affair only emphasis a complete lack of strategic planning. It 
appears as though the bus ride across Wagah into Pakistani territory was 
countered by illegal intrusion by infiltrators into India, up in the mountains 
Dras and Batalik. India, the big brother in this subcontinent, is obvious to 
the political and military moves taking place on its borders. This was 
intelligence failure of reprehensible proportions and merits the resignation 
of many key functionaries. 
-,-,-,SUBRAHMANYAM COMMITTEE 
189. BHARGAVA (GS). Kargil Review a cover up? Mainstream. 37, 33; 1999, 
August, 7; 31. 
]12 
The new round of controversy is the appointment of the Subrahmanyam 
committee to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the 
Kargil district of Ladalch, and to recommended such measures as are 
necessary to safeguard national security to borrow the officials of the govt. 
statement. It will review the political, military and administrative 
dimensions of Kargil including the relevant historical aspects. The line of 
control was neither a fenced border nor marked on the ground by pillars 
and other structures. The political leadership lays down policy, like not 
crossing the line of control in the present case. 
-,-,-, SUPPORT, RAILWAYS 
190. DASGUPTA (Saibal). Rail profits unaffected by Kargil diversions. 
Business Standard. 24, 341; 1999, July, 5; 2. 
The railways would be extending all support to the armed forces even if it 
affected business. However, it was going through a season of lean demand 
and so there was very little effect on the business, was the railways have 
kept on hold its plans to offer larger discounts on freight to attract more 
customers for several reasons one of which was the situation in Kargil. 
-,-,-, TERRORISM 
191. AZIZ HANIFFA. Pak must stop terrorism US. The pioneer. 9, 208; 1999, 
July, 30; 1. 
The US has asked Pakistan to immediately stop shelling across the line of 
control as well as cross border terrorism in Kashmir if a solution to the 
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bilateral dispute was to be found under the Lahore process. Washington 
believed Mr, Sharif had been true to his promise and had with drawn all the 
Pakistan backed infiltrators from Kargil, it continued to be concerned about 
acts of terrorism about shelling that may be taking place. 
-,-,-, TERRORISM 
192. BHATIA (UP). Intimations of move Kargil. Organiser. 51, 2; 1999, 
August, 8; 13. 
In this article the writer emphasized that the main question being asked by a 
number of media-men who visited Pakistan during the Kargil operations 
and who have seen Pakistan as a frightfully changed country bristling with 
lace of armed crusaders raring to descend on Kashmir. There were serious 
risks of these militants already infiltrated and placed in positions in various 
parts of Jammu and Kashmir carrying out simultaneous acts of terrorism 
with an escalation on the intensity in the aggression across the line of 
control. 
-,-,-, THREAT PERCEPTIONS, INCREASED 
193. GOKHALE (Nitin A). The Kargil cover up Outlook 5, 30; 1999, August, 9; 
10. 
The army chief and the defence ministry informed them of increased threat 
perceptions and possibility of incursions by Pakistan backed infiltrators 
across the line of control in Kargil. Investigations now reveal that the main 
reason for Brig Singh's roll was his having serious professional differences 
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with Major General Budhwar There is clear chain of command in the army 
which unabigueosly determines that on all operational matters on officer 
commanding a unit or a formation will communicate to his next senior 
officer. The army raises the bogey of national security when faced with 
uncomfortable facts. 
-,-,-, UNCHANGED SITUATION 
194. SURI (Kavita). APHC feels betrayed by Pak. The Statesman. 140, 29 (s); 
1999, July, 25; 2. 
The Kargil crisis may have blown over, but the all party Hurriyat 
conference sees no change in the ground situation in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Lahore declaration between India and Pakistan, feels betrayed by Pakistan, 
which otherwise has been supporting the Kashmir freedom struggle 
politically, morally and diplomatically. 
-,-,-, UNSOLVED PROBLEM 
195. CORE ISSUE of Kashmir must take Precedence. Muslim India. 17, 198; 
1999, June; 283. 
Pakistan India relations have remained mired in wars, tensions and 
confrontation. The core dispute of Jammu and Kashmir has remained 
unresolved. Firing between our troops still continues along the line of 
control arid on the siachen glacier. The Lahore declaration also under scores 
the commitment of both sides to the principles and purposes. The unclear 
tests served to focus attention on the need for resolving this root cause of 
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tensions between the two countries, since it had become a nuclear flash 
point. 
-,-,-, VAJPAYEE AND SHARIF 
196. BHAGAT (Rasheeda). Some Pakistanis still cont. on Mr. Vajpayee. 
Business Line. 6, 234; 1999, August, 23; 1. 
During the Kargil conflict and in its after math, he had been blowing hot 
and hotter at Pakistan and threatening and to give a fitting reply to Pakistan 
if it goes the Kargil way in the future. If these two leaders negotiate they 
can solve the problem but they need the will to find a solution. Mr. 
Vajpayee and Mr. Nawaz Sharif are tow very powerful people and 
fundamentalist. Their credentials will not be challenged in their own 
country. 
-,-,-,VAJPAYEE'S BUS YATRA 
197. JOSHI (Rakesh). War ahead. Business India. 557; 1999, July, 12-25; 42-4. 
Vajpayee's bus yatra to Lahore and his governments decision to lift the visa 
restrictions on eminent Pakistanis citizens had struck a responsive chord 
among a section of the Muslim community, but there was no certainty that 
This would translate into votes. In any case that was pre-Kargil. Indian 
army had joined hands with their Hindu brethren in repulsing the Pakistani 
intruders across the line of control. Vajpayee tried to the Muslim psyche on 
his governments response to the Kargil crisis. It was becoming clear that 
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the BJP led coalition is attempting to steal a march over its main competitor 
the congress in the arena of economic reforms, 
-,-,-, VIEW, PAKISTANI SOLDIERS 
198. NAYAR (Kuldip) LOC. becomes International Border. Radiance. 34, 24; 
1999, July, 4-10; 8-9. 
The Loc. is permanent. Pakistan has to respect the line if it does not want to 
be single doubt as an aggressor. Apparently the Pakistani armed forces have 
a visited interest in war against India, they have no faith in peace . they 
want to gustain the atmosphere of ill, will and hatred. The armed forces in 
Pakistan are living in a world of their own. In fact, the incursions of the 
Pakistani forces have created in India a sense of solidarity which was 
lacking before. Political parties have criticized the BJP led coalition for not 
keeping them in the picture. But all of them stand behind the government in 
operations in the Kargil area to vacate the aggression. 
-,-,-,VIEW, PEOPLE 
199. MUBASHIR HASAN. Kargil; Scattered Realities. Mainstream. 37, 32; 
1999, July, 31; 9. 
Today the people of India and Pakistan over whelmingly stand for peace. 
They want their governments to move in the direction of improving 
relations and settling disputes prime ministers Vajpayee's decision not to 
cross the line of control should not be dismissed by Pakistanis with the 
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argument that the Indian invasion would have been repulsed by Pakistan. 
The stand of the Indian government that it will not talk peace unless the 
Kargil Brass heights have been cleared of the Mujahideen . two remarkable 
occurrences in the fighting in the Kargil drass sector have not received the 
recognition they deserved One the feat of the mujahidden to scale and 
occupy, two the restring shown by the govt, of India. 
-,-,-, VIEW, VAJPAYEEE'S 
200. JHA (Prem Shankar). Grim truth about Kargil. new thinking communist. 
10, 9; 1999, June, 25; 19. ' 
Pakistan plans to cleanse Kargil of shias and doda of Hindus, then cut off 
the valley's links to leh and the south, prime minister A.B. Vajpayee refers 
to Kargil as a war like situation and not a war. A foreign office spokesman 
describes Pakistan's actions as a kind of invasion. If India manages to oust 
Pakistan from Kargil, something much, much worse could follow. 
-,-,-,VIEWS, BENAZIR BHUTTO 
201. SAW ANT (Gaurav C). China thaw helps army fight kargil chill. The Indian 
Express. 67, 265; 1999, August, 1; 1. 
Even while battling Pakistan intruders in the Kargil sector, the Indian army 
had been keeping in regular touch with its Chinese counterparts. Benazir 
Bhutto says the Kargil intrusions isolated Pakistan. " I knew it would be 
another Iraq. I Know it would be what happened when Saddam Hussain 
went into Kuwait. At that time also, Sharif had made every body feel that 
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Iraq was going to win" she said calling the intnjsion the biggest blunder 
made by sharif 
-,-,-, VIEWS, BJP LEADERS 
202. MUKERJI (Debashish). Elivir called Kargil . The week. 17, 34; 1999, 
August, 8; 68. 
Primarily the Kargil intrusion and the subsequent successful expulsion of 
the infiltrators. Officially the BJP has taken the position that it will not try 
to derive any political mileage out of Kargil. Kargil is not the BJP's 
victory, it is the nations victory. It is the victory of the Indian army. The 
arrival of coffins and body bags containing the crops of soldiers killed in 
action has had tremendous impact throughout the country. Though they 
continue to be coy about the electoral benefits of Kargil, BJP leaders 
privately hope they have a situation akin to that in 1971, 1977 and 1984, 
when voters rose above petty considerations of caste and community to 
vote overwhelmingly on a single issue. In spite of the Kargil war, few 
privations have get been imposed on the people. The government is running 
smoothly without having to face a crisis any other week. 
-,-,-, VIEWS, GRISH CHANDRA SAXENA 
203. SURI (Kavita). Post Kargil challenge an uphill task. The Statesman. 140, 
179; 1999, July, 31; 2. 
The Governor of Jammu and Kashmir state Mr. Girish Chandara Saxen said 
the biggest challenge before the state govt, in the post Kargil period was to 
119 
improve the situation tin the entire state and not allow the present state of 
affairs to slide back. Refraining to the Kargil crisis, it had a new dimension 
which in no way was related to the militancy they had witnessed during the 
past 10 years. 
-,-,-,VIOLENT PHASE • 
204. MEHTA (Ashok K). kargil to kutch. Sunday. 26, 34; 1999, August, 22-28; 
21-25. 
The downing of the Pak atlantique aircraft on 9 August, 1999, has shifted 
the international focus from Kargil to kutch. The initial aggression in both 
cases was used to test Indian resolve to defend Jammu and Kashmir. When 
armed infiltrations made bold by serial attacks on regular army and 
paramilitary post. The audacity of these frontal operations marks the new 
and violent phase of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. It demolishes the 
claim the insurgency has been contained. It was describe as a cowardly act 
on the part of India to avenge the loss of two aircraft over Kargil. 
-,-,-WARLIKE SITUATION 
205. MICHAEL FATHERS. Fighting in the Heavens. Time. 1999, July, 12, 19-
19. 
Indian soldiers brave fierce fire as they push to reclaim territory seized by 
Pakistani intruders. In this conflict every this is a hyperbole. The 
pronouncements of the military command cannot mask the dirty. Vicious 
reality of the fighting around Kargil. This is war. It is not a limited conflict 
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as politician son both sides of the hne of control insist, both countries 
appear to be under standing casualities. Pakistanis prefer to fight it out 
rather than surrender. In the town of Kargil, once the halfway stop for 
tourists traveling to the Buddhist uplands of Ladakh. At last after week of 
uncertainty, miscalculations and indecision India's military juggernaut is 
beginning to roll. If we go by climate alone India has until mid October to 
win its Mountain tops before show blocks. 
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